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Abstract
We investigate behaviors in organizational and financial economics by utilizing and
developing the latest techniques from game theory, experimental economics, compu-
tational testbed, and decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
In the first chapter, we use game theory and experimental economics approaches to
analyze the relationships between corporate culture and the persistent performance
differences among seemingly similar enterprises. First, we show that competition
leads to higher minimum effort levels in the minimum effort coordination game. Fur-
thermore, we show that organizations with better coordination also lead to higher
rates of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. This supports the theory that
the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games act as a focal point for
the outcome of subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game. In turn, we argue that these
endogenous features of culture developed from coordination and cooperation can help
explain the persistent performance differences.
In the second chapter, using a computational testbed, we theoretically predict
and experimentally show that in the minimum effort coordination game, as the cost
of effort increases: 1. the game converges to lower effort levels, 2. convergence speed
increases, and 3. average payoff is not monotonically decreasing. In fact, the average
profit is an U-shaped curve as a function of cost. Therefore, contrary to the intuition,
one can obtain a higher average profit by increasing the cost of effort.
In the last chapter, we investigate a well-known paradox in finance. The equity
market home bias occurs when the investors over-invest in their home country assets.
The equity market home bias is a paradox because the investors are not hedging their
risk optimally. Even with unrealistic levels of risk aversion, the equity market home
viii
bias cannot be explained using the standard mean-variance model. We propose am-
biguity aversion to be the behavioral explanation. We design six experiments using
real-world assets and derivatives to show the relationship between ambiguity aversion
and home bias. We tested for ambiguity aversion by showing that the investor’s sub-
jective probability is sub-additive. The result from the experiment provides support
for the assertion that ambiguity aversion is related to the equity market home bias
paradox.
Keywords: Experiments, Coordination Game, Competition, Corporate Culture,
Equilibrium Selection, Organization, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Computational Testbed,
Equity Market Home Bias, Mean-Variance Model, Ambiguity Aversion.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is divided into the advancement of two topics: organizational eco-
nomics and financial economics. We investigate these topics by utilizing and devel-
oping the latest techniques and theories from game theory, experimental economics,
computational testbed, and the field of decision-making under risk and uncertainty.
Organizational economics is a relatively new and interdisciplinary field. It can be
defined as the study of within-firm behavior. Organizational economics is an inter-
section of the following fields that help explain the economics behind an organization:
contract theory (agency theory), theory of the firm, institutions, labor economics, law
and economics (property rights and transaction cost), organizational behavior (team
theory), industrial organization, and others. Figure 1.1 provides a general position-
ing of organizational economics. Although these intersecting fields are much older,
such as transaction cost theory by Coase (1937) or even the later days of Williamson
(1975)’s theory of why a single market cannot replace every individual firms, the
name organizational economics have only begun to be used 20 years ago. In the or-
ganizational economics portion of the dissertation, we address the question of how to
improve the efficiency of an organization by changing the organizational environment.
In comparison, financial economics is much more established and easier to define
than organizational economics. Financial economics is a field which is interested in
market equilibrium and optimal investment decisions across time and uncertainty.
For example, financial economics addresses question such as “how much should one
spend today and save for future consumptions?” In the financial economics portion of
2the dissertation, we focus primary on a specific type of uncertainty called ambiguity
and develop how individuals invest when faced with such an uncertainty.
We begin with Chapter 2 titled Improving Coordination and Cooperation Through
Competition and Chapter 3 titled Designing Experiments with Computational Testbeds:
Effects of Convergence Speed in Coordination Games which are dedicated to the ad-
vancement of organizational economics. In Chapter 2, we use game theory and exper-
imental economics approaches to analyze the relationships between corporate culture
and the persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises. First,
we show that competition leads to higher minimum effort levels in the minimum effort
coordination game. This implies that organizations with competitive institutional de-
sign are more likely to have better coordination, hence better performance outcome.
Furthermore, we show that organizations with better coordination also lead to higher
rates of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. In other words, workers from an
organization that coordinates well are also more likely to cooperate with one another.
This supports the theory that the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination
games act as a focal point for the outcome of subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game. In
turn, we argue that these endogenous features of culture developed from coordination
and cooperation can help explain the persistent performance differences.
In Chapter 3, using a computational testbed, we theoretically predict and exper-
imentally show that in the minimum effort coordination game, as the cost of effort
increases: 1. the game converges to lower effort levels, 2. convergence speed increases,
and 3. average payoff is not monotonically decreasing. In fact, the average profit is
an U-shaped curve as a function of cost. Therefore, contrary to the intuition, one can
obtain a higher average profit by increasing the cost of effort.
The last chapter, Chapter 4 titled Ambiguity Aversion in Asset Markets: Experi-
mental Study of Home Bias, is dedicated to the advancement of financial economics.
We investigate a well-known paradox in finance called the home bias paradox. The
equity market home bias occurs when the investors over-invest in their home coun-
try assets. The equity market home bias is a paradox because the investors are not
hedging their risk optimally. Even with unrealistic levels of risk aversion, the eq-
3uity market home bias cannot be explained using the standard mean-variance model.
We propose ambiguity aversion to be the behavioral explanation. We design six ex-
periments using real-world assets and derivatives to show the relationship between
ambiguity aversion and home bias. We tested for ambiguity aversion by showing that
the investor’s subjective probability is sub-additive. The result from the experiment
provides support for the assertion that ambiguity aversion is related to the equity
market home bias paradox. This result has an implication that people are willing to
lose money in order to investing in a more familiar company or index.
The topics of organizational economics and financial economics are intertwined in
many ways beyond addressing the classic question of how to efficiently allocate scares
resources. One of the main reasons why this dissertation covers both organizational
and financial economics is to make aware the importance of understanding the rela-
tionship between the insider and outsider’s investment behaviors and the organization
of a firm. As depicted in Chapter 2, inside or outside investors may not invest even
when they face no downside risk. Furthermore, it shows how utilizing a different
organizational structure with investment scheme can select a pareto dominating (i.e.
social welfare enhancing) equilibrium. Chapter 3 shows that higher cost can improve
coordination and attain higher profit but investors may not be aware of such possi-
bility. Chapter 4 presents why brand recognition is so powerful for an organization to
attract outside investment. It is our hope that scholars will further develop the link




























































































Industrial, labor, and organizational economists are intrigued by the existence of
persistent performance differences (PPD) among seemingly similar enterprises (SSE).
Many empirical researches demonstrated that performance differences do exist, whether
measured in productivity or profit in various sectors of industry. These results are
prevalent between and within countries and even at the more narrow level of 5-
digit industries. For example, there is a 156% difference in productivity between the
top 10 and bottom 10 decile in UK manufacturing industries (Disney, Haskel, and
Heden 2003), corporate effects alone can explain up to 18% of variance in profit in the
US (Brush, Bromiley, and Hendrickx (1999) and Roquebert, Phillips, and Westfall
(1996)), and initial defect rates varies by factor of five in the semiconductor manu-
facturing industry (Macher and Mowery 2003). We refer the readers to an excellent
survey paper by Gibbons, Henderson, Repenning, and Sterman (In Press) for a more
detailed discussion of empirical results regarding performance differences.
Because an organization is in essence a repeated game, the folk theorem argues
that any outcome we observe is just different equilibria reached by the organizations.
This paper takes it one step further and states how certain equilibrium results may
6occur. Various studies explained some of the reasoning behind the PPD among SSE.
For example, in addition to Gibbons, Henderson, Repenning, and Sterman (In Press),
Bloom and van Reenen (2007) presents well-studied empirical data which argues that
management skills are part of the explanation for PPD.1 However, management skill
is just another form of labor input. Something that is more general and endogenous
to the firm is corporate culture. Our paper shows the importance of culture that is
developed from coordination and cooperation among the individuals which can help
explain the performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises.
Corporations evolve through different phases as they develop. At the initial stage,
the coordination and the cooperation phases have long-lasting effects on corporate
performance. Consider the following thought exercise: At the initial phase, an orga-
nization deals with many coordination problems. Members in the organization may
come from different social cultures, experiences, ethics, linguistics, or educational
backgrounds. Is working overtime expected? Should people work individually or
in teams? Is email an acceptable form of communication? It may take some time
before the organization establishes a particular corporate culture. We denote this
phase as the coordination phase. After corporate culture matures, individuals can
choose to cooperate or to defect for self-benefit. For example, if email has become an
acceptable form of communication even in urgent matters, one employee may deny
receiving it when it is to his advantage to do so. Or the culture could be such that the
management usually gives proper credit to subordinates, but takes sole credit when
an extraordinary idea is suggested. We denote this as the cooperation phase. Our
experiment replicates a similar time line. We show, in a laboratory setting, that we
can endogenously generate different corporate cultures for a group in the coordina-
tion phase by using different organizational structures, and predict their individual
behavior in the cooperation phase.
In short, our experiment shows the following two main results. First, to show that
organizations with competitive institutional design are more likely to have better co-
1In fact, they detail other interesting results. US companies are usually better managed, compe-
tition leads to better management, and family-owned firms that pass down control to the eldest son
usually do worse.
7ordination, and, in turn, better performance outcome, we show that that competition
leads to higher minimum effort levels in the minimum effort coordination game. Next,
to support the theory that the high-efficiency culture developed in coordination games
acts as a focal point in the cooperation phase, we show that organizations with higher
minimum effort in the coordination game also have a higher rate of cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma game, and, in turn, a better performance outcome. These two
endogenous features have significant performance differences in our experiment.
2.1.1 Corporate Culture
Corporate culture is broadly defined as “the specific collection of values and norms
that are shared by people and groups in an organization and that control the way
they interact with each other...” (Hill and Jones 2001). Corporate culture is un-
deniably prevalent and influential. Many organizational theorists have studied the
psychological and sociological impacts and the measurements of corporate culture
(e.g., Cameron and Quinn (2005), Kotter and Haskett (1992), Sorensen (2002)) and
some have studied formation of norms (Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1991), and
Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985)). Southwest Airline once used an ad depicting
a multiple choice exam which question asked “A customer forgets to pack extra baby
formula and has an hour layover in Albuquerque. What do you do?” (Figure 2.1).
The choices of answers were a) Wish her luck, b) Suggest an excellent restaurant
across town, or c) Go find some formula and pick up a coloring book for her older
child. Answer c) is going beyond what is expected of an employee at a typical airline
but it portrays that Southwest airline’s culture is to do exactly that: go beyond what
is expected (Camerer and Malmendier 2007).
Another example is the culture at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech).
Although not a corporation in the usual sense, Caltech operates under a honor code
system that states that a student will not take advantage of another Caltech member.
Students from other universities may have hard time grasping the concept and how
it is enforced. However, Caltech’s honor code system works extremely well; students
8are usually given take home exams that may be timed or un-timed, closed or open
book, but ultimately self administered.2 Lastly, one of the most important cultural
understandings of the US military is the retrieval of US soldiers. If there is even a
remote chance that a fellow soldier is alive, the soldiers do everything within their
means to save the fellow soldier, even if it threatens additional lives. This type of
culture helped develop the US military to be the most elite all-volunteer military force
in the world. Consider for a second that the corporate culture was to leave the soldier
behind enemy lines. How dedicated would the soldier be in dangerous missions?
Figure 2.1: Ad from Southwest Airline Inflight Magazine
Although it is not as widely studied nor as mature as it is in management science,
economists have begun to acknowledge that corporate culture is an integral part of
studying the theory of firm. Culture is studied indirectly by using a relational con-
tract in a repeated game theory framework (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002). It is
2Having done my undergrad education at another university and being an economist, I too was
very surprised by Caltech’s system. However, I too saw myself self-enforcing the honor code system.
9also studied in a direct manner: Kreps (1990) emphasized the culture as a focal point
(Schelling 1960), Cremer (1993) and Cremer (1986) viewed culture as an investment,
and Hermalin (2001) argued culture as an efficiency improving mechanism. Hermalin
(In Press) provides a helpful literature review of where the economic field is in terms
of corporate culture. Furthermore, experimental economists contributed to a com-
plementary ways of studying corporate culture. Feiler and Camerer (In Press) and
Weber and Camerer (2003) have conducted an experimental study of how firms may
endogenously create codes to communicate and how mergers will create a disruption
in production due to “language barrier” in codes.
Although corporate cultures can be seen as a firm-specific technology, it cannot be
easily transferred or purchased even in similar industries.3 These literature all point to
the crucial roles corporate culture plays in affecting corporate performance. First, it is
a cheap way of increasing productivity. For example, having a well-implemented cul-
ture of “do no evil”, like Google, Inc., can reduce principal’s monitoring cost. Second,
it provides us researchers with an equilibrium prediction. With a good understanding
of the culture, we can better predict whether the members in the organization will
be more self-serving or cooperative.
2.1.2 Overview of the Paper
In this paper, we use both game theory and experimental economics approaches to
demonstrate two relationships between corporate culture and PPD among SSE. First,
we show that competition leads to better coordination in the minimum effort coordina-
tion game: organizations with institutional design that induces competition are more
likely to have better coordination. This result is consistent with previous findings
where competition provides higher performance, such as in the tournament structure
(Lazear and Rosen 1981) or managerial performance (Bloom and van Reenen 2007).
Furthermore, we show that stronger coordination also leads to higher rate of coop-
eration in the prisoner’s dilemma game, even when non-cooperation is individually
3It is probably harder for a similar industry to adopt since there is a first mover’s advantage.
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beneficial. In sum, we show that high-efficiency culture developed in coordination
games act as a focal point for the outcome of a subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game.
We operationalize minimum effort coordination games as organizations’ coordina-
tion problems, and prisoner’s dilemma game as cooperation problems. We have two
experimental treatments for the coordination phase: competitive and non-competitive
setting. In the competitive treatment, there are two firms, where firms are indepen-
dently playing the minimum effort coordination game. In the non-competitive setting,
there is only one firm. In both treatments, there are external investors whose payoff
is determined by the performance of the firm. Furthermore, the investment linearly
increases the payoff for the workers in the firm, and they know the investment prior
to any decision making. As will be detailed in the experimental design section, this
procedure is done to control for risk-dominance. Our experimental design benefited
greatly from Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel (2002)’s (BGN) experiment that supports
the idea that competition can improve coordination. Three major differences distin-
guish our research from BGN’s. First, as mentioned, we control for risk-dominance
in the competition setting. Second, our investment is constructed endogenously and
is more aligned with the principal-agent framework. Lastly, both the competitive
and non-competitive setting has investors in our design, providing a way to compare
one-firm and two-firm treatments. Our design also benefited from results by Brandts
and Cooper (2006) and Hamman, Rick, and Weber (2007) (HRW). Both papers are
excellent experimental papers that study the relationship between effort choices and
exogenous one-time changes to the payoff function. Here, exogenous change means
that the change is not controlled by anyone participating in the experiment. Brandts
and Cooper and HRW showed that, after observing coordination failure, periodic and
exogenous changes of the payoff function in a non-affine manner4 to increase the ben-
efits from coordinating (compared to previous period’s payoff) improve coordination.
Adapting from their studies, our experiment deals with endogenous changes and affine
transformations to the payoff function. We show that the effort levels from the com-
4A non-affine transformation may change risk-domiance. An affine function is a function that is
both concave and convex.
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petitive setting stochastically dominate the non-competitive setting. Interestingly,
the distribution of effort levels from the one-firm treatment is not statistically differ-
ent from the distribution of effort levels made by the lower performing firm in the
competitive setting. Furthermore, even though the experiment was designed so that
the investors cannot lose any of their investments, we observe that the investors do not
fully invest their endowment in the poor performing firm even in the non-competitive
setting. This punishment mechanism does not increase the effort levels.
Similar to Knez and Camerer (2000)’s design, given that the corporation has
developed a culture of high levels of coordination, we also find that this induces the
agents to be more likely to cooperate even in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game.
Our paper provides a stronger result in that our prisoner’s dilemma game is a one-shot
game rather than a repeated game. Furthermore, unlike Knez and Camerer (2000),
our organization for the coordination game consists of group size strictly greater than
2.5 When we present the subjects with a prisoner’s dilemma game which is played
with another member from the group with whom they played the coordination game,
cooperation is approximately 30% more likely than defection when there is a higher
level of coordination.6
5A problem with having a coordination game with group size of 2 is that the individuals coordinate
very well. Therefore, Knez’s study was not able to get much variation in level of coordination (they
all fully coordinated) to genuinely study the relationship between coordination and cooperation.
6One caveat we like to acknowledge from the start is that an experiment conducted at an uni-
versity with group of students cannot fully generalize the complexity of standard organization in
the business world. For example, this experiment is done without communication which surely exist
in a typical corporation. However, one of the objectives of this paper is to study how the initial
equilibrium selection of an organization effects the future selections. When an organization first
begins, there is a coordination problem (due to language barrier, cultural differences, jargons, etc.)
which becomes an obstacle to communication. One can see this no-communication experiment as an
extreme version of that scenario. There have been studies which state that student’s behavior at the
lab is a good predictor of professional’s behavior in these abstract settings (Ball and Cech 1996) but
further studies of how the short-run organizational behavior in lab will generalize to the long-run
organizational behavior is definitely needed. Experiments are extreme simplifications but that is
their advantage. We view experiments as another form of methodology to gain data and insights.
By using this controlled and simple environment, we are able to better understand how certain
features will effect the organization.
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2.1.3 Agenda
The paper proceeds as follows. We first introduce the general setup and review
of the game of interest. Then we present the experimental design and the main
hypotheses. We then follow with detailed analysis in the result section. We finish
with a summarizing conclusion.
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2.2 General Setup and Review
2.2.1 Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Minimum effort coordination game (MECG, and also known as the weak-link game)
takes the following form: Given N agents, every agent chooses an effort level ei ∈







− β(ei) + δ where α > β > 0, δ ∈ R for all agents i ∈ N (2.1)





Hence, there are M many pure strategy equilibria: everyone choosing ei = 1, everyone
choosing ei = 2 and so on. Let’s consider an example of which M = 7, α = 400, β =
200, and δ = 1100. The game can be then summarized by Table 2.1.
Minimum effort of all the agents
Agent i’s effort 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 2500 2100 1700 1300 900 500 100
6 - 2300 1900 1500 1100 700 300
5 - - 2100 1700 1300 900 500
4 - - - 1900 1500 1100 700
3 - - - - 1700 1300 900
2 - - - - - 1500 1100
1 - - - - - - 1300
Table 2.1: Minimum Effort Coordination Game Payoff for Agent i
This game has several features. First off, it has 7 pure strategy Nash Equilibria:
ei = 1 ∀i ∈ N , ei = 2 ∀i ∈ N , ..., ei = 7 ∀i ∈ N . An interesting question to
address in games with multiple equilibria is the equilibrium selection. However, given
this particular game structure with strict Nash Equilibria, many of the standard
notions of refinements, such as trembling hand perfection, will not help to reduce any
14
equilibria. Using the reasoning of Harsanyi and Selton (1988), we are able to focus
on two particularly interesting equilibria: the payoff dominant equilibrium and the
risk dominant equilibrium. Everyone choosing effort level 7 is the payoff dominant
equilibrium since this equilibrium pareto dominates all other equilibria. Choosing
an effort level 1 is the least-efficient equilibrium but it can be seen as maximizing
the worst-case scenario. In terms of Harsanyi and Selten, this equilibrium is the
risk dominant equilibrium; by choosing an effort level of 1, the agent minimizes the
uncertainty and, in MECG, secures a specific payoff regardless of the actions of other
agents. Harsanyi and Selten further argue that payoff dominance should be the first
criterion applied.
However, in tacit environment, experiments have shown that people fail to coor-
dinate to a payoff dominant equilibrium. Rather they end up at the risk dominant
equilibrium. The leading example is produced by van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1990)
(VHBB). In VHBB’s experiment, participants played the minimum effort coordina-
tion game without communication. The only statistics observable by the participant
was the minimum effort of the group. The size of the group consisted of 14-16 partic-
ipants and each were instructed to choose an integer effort level of 1 to 7 with 1 being
the risk dominant and 7 being the payoff dominant equilibrium. In this and other
similar experiments (See Camerer (2003) for survey), the game generally converges
to a minimum effort of 1 by the 5th period when N > 3. One of the intuitions behind
this experimental result is strategic uncertainty. In short, strategic uncertainty is
the uncertainty arising from not knowing which equilibrium strategy the other play-
ers will implement. The strategic uncertainty increases as the group size increases
(N increases) since agents now have more people to consider, and as the number of
strategies increase (M increases) since the agent now has more Nash Equilibria to
consider.
One of the leading theories of behavior we observe in these experiments is provided
by Crawford, who uses the adaptive learning framework to explain the data for VHBB
(Crawford 1995). After observing the minimum effort level that is weakly lower than
the effort level any one agent has chosen (ei = minj∈N\i{ej}), the agent uses the new
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information to update his next period strategy, in turn, converging to a minimum
effort level of 1.
Two questions one might ask are 1. what would happen if group size is N ≤ 3?
and 2. if the distribution of choices were available instead of just the minimum effort
statistics? VHBB also addresses those two questions. When the group size is small,
the participants coordinate very well. However, with a bigger group size, showing the
distribution of choices does not improve coordination. This can be because when the
group size is small, there is hope in leading by example and being patient. However,
when the group size is ‘big’, seeing the distribution of many low-effort levels is not
much of an encouragement.
Many variations of the minimum effort coordination game have shown improve-
ment of minimum effort in addition to the papers pervious mentioned by Bornstein,
Gneezy, and Nagel (2002), Brandts and Cooper (2006), and Hamman, Rick, and We-
ber (2007). For example, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1992) showed that
having a non-binding pregame communication improves coordination. Even with-
out communication, Weber (2006) provides an experimental result where one slowly
grows the organization to improve coordination. Schmidt, Shupp, Walker, and Os-
trom (2003) provide experimental data that shows coordination improves when risk
dominance is weaker. Furthermore, Cachon and Camerer (1996) showed that people
coordinate better when they are charged a fee to participate which leads to losses of
money in poor equilibrium (loss-avoidance).
2.2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Given the heavy exposure of prisoner’s dilemma game, we will not cover the related




The experiments were conducted at 2 laboratories: the Social Science Experimen-
tal Laboratory (SSEL) at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech), Pasadena,
CA, and the California Social Science Laboratory (CASSEL) at the University of Cal-
ifornia, Los Angeles (UCLA). A total of 128 subjects participated in the experiments.
The average performance-based payment was 19USD. All students were registered
subjects with SSEL / CASSEL (signed a general consent form) and the experiment
was approved by the local research ethics committee at both universities. These labs
consist of over 30 working computers divided into cubical setting, which prevents the
students from viewing another student’s screen.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The instructions were available both in print as well as on
screen for the participants and the Experimenter explained the instructions in detail
out-loud. Participants were also given a brief quiz after instruction to insure proper
understanding of the game and the software. A sample instruction that was provided
to the participants is attached at the Appendix.
The subjects were randomly assigned their roles in the experiment and did not
change their roles for the entire experiment. Furthermore, no subjects participated in
more than one experiment. The identity of the participants as well as their individ-
ual decisions were kept as private information. However, each group knew the total
investment their group received, their own group’s minimum effort (not the other
group’s effort level), and the investors only knew their own investment level as well as
the minimum effort of all the groups. The experiment used fictitious currency called
francs and the expected payment for the investors and group members were com-
parable. The participants were told that the experiment consisted of undetermined
number of rounds to prevent end game effect. All participants filled out a survey
immediately after the experiment.
Terminology: In terms of terminology, we avoided any priming effects by using
neutral language during the experiment. More specifically, we used language such as
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groups and numbers instead of firms and effort levels. For consistency of this paper,
we will refer to groups as firms and investors henceforth. The members in a firm
will be called workers. However, we can consider these not only as firms but also as
different divisions within a firm. In other words, this setting can be applied to both
inter- and intra-organization levels. Lastly, we will refer to the number chosen by the
subject as effort level throughout the paper.
2.3.1 Two-Firm (Competitive) Treatment
Below is the sequence of the experiment.
1. Investors privately decide on how much to invest in Firm 1 and Firm 2.
2. The workers observe the aggregate investment for their firm.
3. The workers privately select a number between 1 - 7.
4. The minimum number for each firm is shown to the investors along with their
current period payoff and total payoff.
5. The workers are shown the minimum number selected with their own firm. In
addition, the workers are shown their individual payoff for the current period
and the total payoff.
6. The period comes to an end and the next period begins.
7. Experiment concludes at an indefinite period.
We conducted 4 sessions of the two-firm treatment (3 at UCLA and 1 at Caltech).
Subjects in the two-firm treatment were divided into three groups: Firm 1, Firm 2,
and Investors. Each of the firms had 6 workers and there were total of 4 investors.
Investors: In each period, investors were given 100 francs to invest. Investors
were allowed to invest in any combination such that for any investor i, investment to
Firm 1 is I i1 ≥ 0, investment to Firm 2 is I i2 ≥ 0 and I i1 + I i2 ≤ 100. Investors kept
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any endowment not invested. The payoffs from the investment were determined by













× I i2 (2.2)
where R(min{ei}) represents the following multiplier in Table 2.2.
min{ei} 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
R(min{ei}) 2.5 2.25 2.0 1.75 1.5 1.25 1.0
Table 2.2: Multiplier for R(min{ei}) for Both Firms
These multipliers are standard in experimental economics, such as the trust game,
centipede game, and many others. Notice that investors cannot lose money from
investment and it is weakly dominant to always invest.
Workers: Each firm consisted of 6 people and the composition of the firm did not
change for the entire experiment. The workers played the MECG explained before
with the following variation. Worker i in firm j was choosing a number ei ∈ {1, 2, ..., 7}












j , the sum of total investment made to the firm j. Notice
that the best response does not change: ei = minj∈N\i{ej}. Furthermore, the entire
equilibrium structure remains the same. In particular, risk dominance is invariant
with respect to isomorphisms (Harsanyi and Selton 1988). The worker’s payoff matrix
can be summarized by Table 2.3. These parameters were chosen so that in the worst
case the worker will end with at least 100 francs and not a negative amount. This is
to reduce confounding effects such as loss aversion.
The design choice was made with simplicity in mind. Obviously, there are more
complex contracts that can induce better performance than a fixed-wage contract,
















































































































































































































schedule that is less likely to induce coordination improvement. The focus of the study
is not whether different contracts can induce coordination but whether competition
can help improve coordination. We want to minimize the confounding effects. The
design of the Ij parameters were again chosen for simplicity of computation during
the experiment, as well as to not change the risk dominance of the game. Instead of
using the payoff to workers pi = 400 (mini∈N ei) − 200ei + 1100 + Ij, we could have
also used the payoff pi = 400 (mini∈N ei)− 200ei + 1100 + IjN , but there is no a priori
reason to think scalar multiplication of investment will make a difference. The profit
function for firm j which constructs the model above is
∏
j = Ij(R(min(ei)) + 6) +
6(αmin(ei) + δ) and was not shown to the subjects in the experiment.
21
2.3.2 One-Firm (Non-Competitive) Treatment
The one-firm treatment is identical to the two-firm treatment except that there is now
only one firm. We conducted 4 sessions of the one-firm treatment (3 at UCLA and
1 at Caltech). Again, the equilibrium structure does not change. The comparison
between the design of the two treatments can be summarized by the Table 2.4.
Two-Firm Treatment One-Firm Treatment
Investor’s Choice: Firm 1, Firm 2, Firm 1
How much to invest in and Nobody and Nobody
Performance knowledge Investors: All Investors: All
Workers: Own Firm Workers: Own Firm
Investment Knowledge Own Firm Own Firm
Can investors lose money? No No
Table 2.4: Comparing the Two-Firm and One-Firm Treatments
2.3.3 Standard Treatment
We ran 2 sessions at UCLA and 2 at Caltech of the standard minimum effort coordi-
nation game using the payoff from Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Cooperation Design
We used a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game to test whether subjects are more likely




A $3, $3 $1, $4
B $4, $1 $2, $2
Table 2.5: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
We did not inform the subjects beforehand that they would be playing a prisoner’s
dilemma game. The subjects were randomly (anonymously) matched to one other
person from the same group that they were part of during the coordination game. For
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example, someone from Firm 1 was paired with another person from Firm 1. Subjects
were clearly told that this was being played only once and we have obtained the data
from the cooperation design only from the UCLA subjects.7 We chose the prisoner’s
dilemma game because this game has one pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is
dominant solvable. In the example from Table 2.5, the pareto-efficient outcome is
to cooperate-cooperate but it is not an equilibrium. Nash equilibrium is to chose B.
Following the standard prisoner’s dilemma terminology, we consider choosing A as
cooperating while choosing strategy B as not cooperating. Given the structure of the
game, choosing to cooperate in one shot prisoner’s dilemma provides a strong result.
2.3.5 Hypothesis
For the coordination phase, we tested whether the workers in the two-firm treatment
coordinated better than in the one-firm treatment. Better coordination can mean
three things: 1. achieve higher minimum effort level, 2. achieve lower wasted effort, or
3. achieve faster convergence to an equilibrium. For consistency with other literatures,
we are referring to higher minimum effort level when we state that some setting has
a better coordination. However, we will show that there is no difference in wasted
effort and rate of convergence between different settings in the result section. For the
cooperation phase, we test whether subjects coming from a better-coordinating firm
are also more likely to cooperate.
Hypothesis 1 Higher Minimum Effort. Subjects in the two-firm treatment will choose
higher minimum effort level than the one-firm treatment.
Hypothesis 2 Likelihood of Cooperation. Subjects are more likely to cooperate in
the prisoner’s dilemma game if they have also coordinated well in the MECG.
7We only obtained the data from UCLA because this part of the experiment was incorporated




Figure 2.2 and 2.3 show the summary results aggregated over all four sessions of
the two-firm treatment. For the analysis, we have separated the sample into two
sets. The first set, denoted higher performing firm, consists of firms that had higher
minimum effort for a given session. The second set, denoted lower performing firm,
is the complement set of the higher performing firm. Of the two firms per session, we
define a firm as higher performing if it achieves a higher minimum effort by period 5.
There were no cases in which a firm with a higher effort by period 5 ended up having
a lower minimum effort at any time from period 5 to 10 (10 being the last period).
We observe that mean choice of effort was between 6-3 with all firms, while the
mean choice of effort was between 6-4 and 5-2 for the higher and lower performing
firm, respectively (Figure 2.3). The average minimum effort was between 3-4 with
all firms, while the average minimum effort was between 3-5 and 1-3 for the higher
and lower performing firm, respectively (Figure 2.2). We compared the distribution
of average choice per period of each subsample to show that the difference in perfor-
mance between higher and lower performing firms is statistically significant. Table
2.6 contains the results from the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Furthermore,
Figure 2.4 graphs the kernel estimated cumulative distribution function of each of the
subsamples. Results from the KS test and the CDF graph show that the higher per-
forming firm indeed chose statistically significantly higher (p-value of 0) effort levels
than the lower performing firm.8 Lastly, we conclude from Table 2.7, a cross-sectional
time series FGLS regression for average effort level, that average effort level for period
t is predominately determined by firm’s previous period’s minimum effort (coefficient:
0.699 for higher performing firm and 0.91 for the lower performing firm), and mini-
mally, but statically significantly, determined by the percent wealth invested to the
firm. The effect of investment for the higher performing firms is negative (coefficient:
8The cdf of the higher performing firm stochastically dominates the cdf of the lower performing
firm.
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-0.016) while for the lower performing firm is positive (coefficient: 0.0145). This is be-
cause there is an upper and lower bound to the possible effort and investment level.
The investors will end up investing 100% of their wealth in the higher performing
firm, so decrease in average effort in time will show up as a negative effect. Yet, the
investors have no reason to shift their investment from higher performing to lower
performing firm as long as the higher performing firm is indeed outperforming the
lower firm. Also, as the average effort approaches 1 for the lower performing firm,
even modest investment will show up as a positive effect.
Figure 2.2: Average Minimum Effort for Two-Firm Treatment
Table 2.8 and 2.9 further analyzes the investment behavior. Although investors
start out by investing 50-50 between both firms9, Table 2.8 shows that on the last
period, over 98% of the wealth is invested to the higher performing firm. These means
are significantly different (p<0.000). Another important feature is that the investors
9From Figure 2.2 and 2.3, it may seem as if the investors invested more in the lower performing
firm at first but that is not the case. The investors did invest 50-50 but did not invest their entire
endowment in the first period
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Figure 2.3: Mean Choice of Effort for Two-Firm Treatment
Smaller group D P-value
2 firm setting: higher of the two per session lower 1 0
vs higher 0 1
2 firm setting: lower of the two per session Combined K-S 1 0
2 firm setting: both firms 1 firm 0.567 0.008
vs 2 firm -0.033 0.983
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.567 0.012
2 firm setting: only higher of the two per session 1 firm 0.9 0
vs 2 firm 0 1
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.9 0
2 firm setting: only lower of the two per session 1 firm 0.3 0.407
vs 2 firm -0.1 0.905
1 firm setting Combined K-S 0.3 0.418
Table 2.6: Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test: Average Effort Choice Per Period
26
Figure 2.4: Kernel Estimated CDF of Average Effort Choice
cdf2h is the CDF of the higher performing firm from the two-firm treatment. cdf2l is the CDF of the lower performing
firm from the two-firm treatment. cdf2 is the CDF of the two-firm treatment and cdf1 is the CDF of the one-firm






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































invest their entire endowment, which is not the case in the one-firm treatment. Table
2.9 suggests that the investment behavior at period t is not driven by the firm’s
minimum effort in period t − 1 but by the difference in the two firm’s minimum
effort in period t − 1. The difference in the two firm’s minimum effort is higher
performing firm’s minimum effort minus the lower performing firm’s minimum effort.
Unsurprisingly, the investment has gravitated towards the higher performing firm such
that bigger differences in minimum effort level cause bigger differences in investment
level.
Subject Categories Mean SE Min Max Obs P-value
Higher performing firm 98.313 1.305 94.5 100 4
0
Lower performing firm 1.688 1.305 0 5.5 4
All firms 100 0 100 100 8
Ho: mean(higher performing) - mean(lower performing) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics & T-Test of % Wealth Invested in Two-Firm Treat-















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.5 shows the summary results aggregated over all four sessions of the one-firm
treatment. Here we see that the mean choice (average minimum) effort level ranges
from 2-5 (2-3). According to the FGLS of average effort level in Table 2.7, we find
that the average effort level is predominately determined by the firm’s minimum in
the previous period (coefficient: 0.917), while the percent of wealth invested only has
a small but statistically significant effect (coefficient: 0.013).
One might think that investors will always invest everything since they have noth-
ing to lose, given that they are guaranteed at least their investment in return (firm’s
minimum effort of 1). However, that is not the case. Investors start out by invest-
ing over 90% (not 100%) of their wealth in the first period and invest even smaller
percentage of their wealth in later periods. Referring to Table 2.10, by last period,
the investors are only investing on average of 66% of their wealth. If we subdivide
the sample to two groups, firms with minimum higher than 1 and firms with mini-
mum equal to 1, we observe that the average investment to the firm with minimum
effort of 1 is only 37.75%. However, over 95% of the wealth is invested whenever the
firm’s minimum effort is greater than 1. The investment level difference is statistically
different at p-value of 0.047. In addition, according to the FGLS in Table 2.9, we
conclude that the investment is significantly driven by the previous period’s firm’s
minimum in a positive manner (coefficient: 11.47). Although we cannot distinguish
whether the lack of investment is due to spitefulness or a punishment to encourage
a higher effort level, we observe that there are lower investments to firms performing
poorly. However, withholding investment does not accomplish an increase in effort
level since, according to Table 2.7, the investment variable has a positive coefficient of
0.013, which suggests that lowering investment does not increase average effort level.
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Figure 2.5: Mean Choice and Average Minimum Effort for One-Firm Treatment
Subject Categories Mean SE Min Max Obs P-value
Firms with min > 1 95.625 4.375 91.25 100 2
0.047
Firms with min = 1 37.75 12.250 25.5 50 2
All firms 66.688 17.531 25.5 100 4
Ho: mean(firms with min>1) - mean(firms with min=1) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 2.10: Descriptive Statistics & T-Test of % Wealth Invested in One-Firm Treat-
ment at Last Period
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2.4.3 Two Firm vs One Firm
Recall that the difference between one-firm and two-firm treatment is on the investor’s
outside option depicted by Table 2.4. Figure 2.6 and 2.7 are the pooled graph from
the one-firm and two-firm treatment. An important feature of the graph is that the
mean choice (average minimum) of effort of the one-firm treatment is statistically no
different from the lower performing firm in the two-firm treatment. If there were no
effects between having two firms or one firm, we would expect that mean choice (av-
erage minimum) of the one firm to be statistically no different compared to the mean
choice (average minimum) of both the higher and lower performing firms combined.
Referring back to Table 2.6, the two-sample K-S test comparing the distribution of
average effort choices, and Figure 2.4 (the CDF of average choices), we can make
the following conclusions regarding the comparison of one-firm and two-firm treat-
ment. First, we can reject the null that the distributions from one-firm and two-firm
treatment are not different (p<0.05). Furthermore, we can state that the two-firm
treatment stochastically dominates the one-firm treatment (p<0.01). Next, when we
compare the higher performing of the two-firm treatment to one-firm treatment, we
can reject the null at p-value of 0 that they have the same distribution. In addition,
we conclude that the higher performing of two-firm treatment also dominates the
one-firm treatment (p<0.01). However, when comparing the lower performer of the
two-firm treatment to the one-firm treatment, we cannot reject the null that (i) the
distributions are the same (p-value of 0.418), (ii) neither one-firm treatment nor the
lower performer dominate one another (p-value of 0.407 and 0.905, respectively). In
sum, our data supports hypothesis 1. The subjects in two-firm treatment choose a
higher minimum effort level than the one-firm treatment. Furthermore, we observe
that the results from the one-firm treatment are similar to the results from the lower
performing firm.
One reason why we might see such a difference between one-firm and two-firm
treatment is that workers start out with only about half of the wealth invested in each
firm. Therefore, they work “harder” to earn the rest of the investment. However,
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Figure 2.6: Average Minimum Effort: One-Firm Treatment vs Two-Firm Treatment
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Figure 2.7: Mean Choice of Effort: One-Firm Treatment vs Two-Firm Treatment
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in the one-firm treatment, they are offered almost the entire investment from the
beginning. Although, it does not change the fact that everyone exerting higher effort,
in turn getting a higher minimum effort, is pareto improvement regardless of the
treatment, we tested whether firms who had lower levels of initial investment also
coordinate to the higher minimum effort in the one-firm treatment. The idea is that
the workers will work “harder” to earn the rest of the investment. Our data shows
that the initial investment level has no significant effect on individual’s initial effort
level. By regressing period 1’s individual effort level on the first period’s investment10,
we obtain a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.0235 with SE of
0.04737. This is evidence against the argument that workers are exerting higher
efforts when they observe low investment in the first period because they want to
“earn” higher level of investment in the subsequent period.




So far we have only considered having a higher minimum effort as an indicator of
better coordination. Table 2.11 and Figure 2.8 present the average wasted effort per
period by each individual. Comparing various combinations of two-firm treatment
and one-firm treatment, and just the high performer of two firm and low performer
of two-firm treatment, we do not get any statistically significant differences between
the average wasted effort. At best, the p-value is 0.372 and at worst, it is 0.9 in a
two-tailed t-test. The average wasted effort across both the one-firm and two-firm
treatment is 1.033 per period with standard error of 0.087. Therefore, we conclude
that amount of effort wasted does not vary much between treatments.
Mean SE Num of Obs P-value
(A) 2 firm setting 1.063 0.120 48 (A) & (B) 0.640
(B) 1 firm setting 0.975 0.109 24 (B) & (C) 0.9
(C) 2 firm setting (higher only) 0.954 0.124 24 (B) & (D) 0.404
(D) 2 firm setting (lower only) 1.171 0.206 24 (C) & (D) 0.372
everyone 1.033 0.087 72
Ho: mean(X) - mean(Y) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 2.11: T-Test: Average Wasted Effort Per Period
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Figure 2.8: Average Wasted Effort Per Period
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2.4.5 Convergence
Another method in measuring coordination is the rate of convergence speed to an
equilibrium. Figure 2.9 presents the average number of best responses per period.
For example, if the average rate of best response is 3, this means that on average,
3 agents are best responding in that period. As the graph depicts, there are no
major differences between one-firm or two-firm treatment or between higher or lower
performing firm. In all cases, the average rate of best response starts out low, between
1-1.5, and converges to 3.5-4 by the end of the experiment. Therefore, we conclude
that the rate of convergence speed does not vary much between treatments.
Figure 2.9: Average Rate of Best Response
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2.4.6 Cooperation
Here, we address the relationship between the likelihood of cooperation conditioned
on a firm’s coordination outcome. Table 4.3 is the correlation matrix of our explana-
tory variables. While one may think that the last period’s minimum effort from the
coordination game would have the most significant relationship on cooperation, the
first period’s minimum effort decision had the strongest relationship (ρ = 0.296 and
p-value of 0.018). This may be the case because when the cooperation treatment was
induced by pairing the subjects randomly within the firm, the subjects are condition-
ing their expectation on the how others behaved at the beginning of the coordination
treatment. Not surprisingly, the correlation between firm’s minimum effort at period
1 has correlation of 0.77 with firm’s minimum effort at period 10.
pd gpmin1 gpmin10 gender exptype p1 p10
pd 1
gpmin1 0.296** 1
gpmin10 0.227* 0.772*** 1
gender 0.244* -0.196 -0.238* 1
exptype 0.143 0.346*** 0 -0.011 1
p1 0.037 0.556*** 0.422*** -0.144 0.168 1
p10 0.197 0.726*** 0.916*** -0.262** 0.022 0.409*** 1
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test); n=64
Table 2.12: Correlation Relationship
By running a logit regression of cooperation (1 if cooperated and 0 otherwise,
Table 4.4) we are able to make the following conclusions. When looking at the sole
effect of individual effort choice, this has no significant effects to the likelihood of
cooperation. However, when looking at the sole effect of firm’s minimum on the
first period, this has a positive significant effect (coefficient: 0.398) on the likelihood
of cooperation. This may suggest that the individual’s likelihood of cooperation
is not based on whether the individual is likely to put in high effort in the first
period but whether he comes from a firm that coordinated well. When looking at
the multivariable logit regression, we can make the following conclusions. First, the
three significant variables are individual choice in period 1 (coefficient: 0.723), firm’s
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minimum in period 1 (coefficient: 2.88), and the interaction effect of firm’s minimum
in period 1 with individual effort in period 1 (coefficient: -0.424). This result suggests
that people who chose higher effort levels in first period are also more likely to choose
to cooperate. Furthermore, when a firm has a higher minimum effort, workers in that
firm are more likely to choose to cooperate. Therefore, it is not that the subjects are
trying to take advantage of fellow subjects who seem to be more trusting, but instead
are choosing to cooperate. However, when looking at the interaction effect which has
a negative coefficient, this suggests that a person who initially chose a high effort and
was damaged by low firm’s minimum effort is more likely to choose to defect.11 The
variables relating to period 10’s efforts are not significant.
Ind. Variable Dependent Variable: PD = 1 if cooperate and PD = 0 if defect
Constant -0.725 -1.215** -1.809*** -1.291** -5.217**













Number of Obs 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.030 0.068 0.039 0.205
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test).
numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Table 2.13: Logit Regression: Cooperation
We further subdivide the population to different groups based on effort levels to
determine the types and proportion of the subgroup who cooperate in Figure 2.10 and
11Recall that p1 ≥ gpmin1. Therefore, this does not state the converse which suggests that people
who initially chosen low effort and realized that gpmin1 was higher than his effort are more likely
to take advantage of fellow workers in the cooperation treatment.
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2.11 and Table 2.14 and 2.15 to supplement the result from the logit regression on
Table 4.4. The results from Figure 2.10 and Table 2.14 support the idea that people
who come from firms with higher minimum efforts are more likely to cooperate than
those from lower minimum efforts. This occurs in two ways. First, when comparing
between groups, for example min < j to min ≥ j, there generally is a statistically
significant effect that min ≥ j has higher proportion of cooperation. Secondly, when
comparing within groups, for example min < j to min < j + 1, although the effects
are not statistically significant, we do observe the the proportion of cooperation is
higher for min < j + 1. In terms of individual choices, the results from Figure 2.11
and Table 2.15 supports that individual effort choices are a poor predictor of the
proportion of cooperation.
Figure 2.10: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period Firm’s Mini-
mum
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First Period Firm Min % Cooperated SE Num of Obs P-value
min<2 0.1667 0.0904 18
0.0315
min>1 0.4565 0.0743 46
min<3 0.1667 0.0777 24
0.0071
min>2 0.5000 0.0801 40
min<4 0.2778 0.0757 36
0.0704
min>3 0.5000 0.0962 28
min<5 0.3095 0.0722 42
0.1393
min>4 0.5000 0.1091 22
everyone 0.3750 0.0610 64
Ho: mean(min<i) - mean(min>(i-1)) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 2.14: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period Firm’s Mini-
mum
Figure 2.11: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period’s Individual
Choice
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First Period Individual Choice % Cooperated SE Num of Obs P-value
choice<2 0.3333 0.3333 3
0.8810
choice>1 0.3770 0.0626 61
choice<3 0.1250 0.1250 8
0.1222
choice>2 0.4107 0.0663 56
choice<4 0.2308 0.1216 13
0.2355
choice>3 0.4118 0.0696 51
choice<5 0.3158 0.1096 19
0.5325
choice>4 0.4000 0.0739 45
choice<6 0.4242 0.0874 33
0.4092
choice>5 0.3226 0.0853 31
choice<7 0.4103 0.0798 39
0.4747
choice>6 0.3200 0.0952 25
everyone 0.3750 0.0610 64
Ho: mean(min<i) - mean(min>(i-1)) = diff = 0. Ha: diff != 0
Table 2.15: T-Test: Average Cooperation Conditional on First Period’s Choice
2.5 Conclusion
We set out to study the relationship of persistent performance differences among
seemingly similar enterprises and used corporate culture as part of the explanation.
We defined corporate culture as the ability to coordinate and cooperate. Our contri-
butions are twofold: The experimental results support that competition significantly
improves coordination which pareto improves everyone’s payoff. Furthermore, this in-
crease in coordination also improves the likelihood of cooperating even when defecting
is individually beneficial. That is also a pareto improvement in everyone’s payoff. An
organizational culture of coordinating to an efficient outcome determines the ability
to cooperate even when there is no monitoring by the principal. We conclude that
the results provided in our experiment supports the theory that the endogenous fea-
tures of culture developed from coordination and cooperation can help explain the
persistent performance differences.
As economists, not only are we concerned with existence of equilibrium and its
selection but also efficiency. We have shown that in the coordination game we have
studied, higher levels of coordination lead to higher social surplus. Hence the natural
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question to ask is how to improve coordination and we have provided one way in
doing so. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the pareto-efficient outcome is not an
equilibrium, but an organization was better able to achieve such outcome for greater
social surplus due to the institutional design and corporate culture.
There are many open questions left in this field of study. For example, one can
start focusing on different types of contracts for coordination. Furthermore, unlike
our design, it would be interesting to see how well the firms in one-firm treatment will
coordinate if the investors are not allowed to invest until the 5th period. Of course,
the idea of studying coordination and cooperation in organization can be extended to











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper makes two contributions: First, we use a computational testbed to deter-
mine the experimental parameters. Testbeds are useful because they allow us to run
many simulations over wide range of parameters very cheaply instead of experiment-
ing with the parameters via pilot sessions. Second, we run the actual experiment
using subjects in a laboratory setting to test the predictions made using our testbed.
We make the following three predictions using the testbed which are indeed confirmed
by subjects in experimental laboratory.
In a minimum effort coordination game, increasing the cost of effort causes:
1. The game converge to a lower minimum effort.
2. An increase in convergence speed to an equilibrium.
3. A non-monotonic change in average payoffs.
The intuition behind the results of the minimum effort coordination game is that
there are both negative and positive effects on welfare as cost increases. We use the
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standard notion of welfare; total surplus or in our case, average payoff. The negative
effects of higher cost are in two parts. First, lower payoffs are obtained from the same
strategy profile for a higher cost in effort. In addition, the game also converges to a
lower effort, which causes a lower payoff in general. The positive effects of higher costs
is the faster rate of convergence to an equilibrium. Therefore, there is less wasted
effort from agents searching for the equilibrium to converge. In sum, the average
payoff increases if positive effects outweigh the negative effects, while the average
payoff decreases if the negative effects outweigh the positive effects.
One reason why we implement computation testbed is the general difficulty in
determining the specific parameters to use for the results stated above. One may
guess and run many pilot sessions to guess the exact parameters but this can be a
costly procedure. We propose that a computational testbed, which is often used in
other areas of experimental science such as chemistry, offers an alternative solution
to this problem.
3.1.1 Agenda
We first start with the theory section where we introduce the minimum effort coordi-
nation game, computational testbed, and our theoretical predictions. The details of
the computational testbed and its algorithm are provided in the Appendix. Next, we
proceed with testable hypotheses and our experimental design. We then provide the
experimental results and concluding remarks.
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3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Minimum effort coordination game, also known as a weakest-link game, takes the
following form: Given N agents, every agent chooses an effort level si ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},







− c(si) + δ where α > c > 0, δ ∈ R for all agents i ∈ N (3.1)





Notice that the minimum effort coordination game is a game of strictly complemen-
tarity. In turn, it has multiple equilibria. For this particular class of game, we get
pure strategy equilibria that are pareto ranked. The Nash Equilibria for this game
are any strategy profile that satisfies the following condition: σ = {s1, ..., sN} where
s1 = s2 = ... = sN . For example, everyone choosing si = 3 ∀i ∈ N is a Nash Equilib-
rium. Among these M pure strategy equilibria, a strategy profile σ = {s1, ..., sN} =
{M, ...,M} is the payoff dominant equilibrium, while σ = {s1, ..., sN} = {1, ..., 1} is
the worst, but is a risk dominant equilibrium.
Please refer to Myung (2008 Working Paper) for a more detailed review and the
experimental background of this particular game.
3.2.2 Computational Testbed
A computational testbed is a computer environment that allows us to run simula-
tions in order to make predictions about human behavior. Though these testbeds
will likely never be able to perfectly predict human behavior, they are still a useful
tool for making these predictions. These testbeds allow us to run simulations of an
experiment over a wide variety of parameters. Based on the simulations, we can de-
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velop behavioral hypotheses in these games, as well as select interesting parameters
to be used in a laboratory experimental setting.
Others have developed computational testbeds in order to design experiments. Ar-
ifovic and Ledyard (2005 Working Paper) build computational agents to be used as a
testbed for experiments on the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. In particular, the mech-
anism has one parameter that plays an important role in the speed of convergence.
Arifovic and Ledyard make predictions about optimal values of this parameter with
their computational testbed, and then confirm these predictions with experiments.
Their learning algorithm is a combination of a genetic algorithm with some behavioral
intuition. Their computational agents are able to converge quickly, on average in 20
rounds. Their algorithm strongly favors convergence to a single point. Therefore in a
game like battle of the sexes, their algorithm cannot support the commonly observed
behavior where players learn to alternate meeting places. Our algorithm uses pattern
recognition, and is therefore able to capture this behavior.
For our study, the algorithm determines which choice each agent makes in each
period of a repeated game. This choice depends on the history of play as well as the
agent’s current state. After each agent made their choice, the choices and payoffs are
revealed to all agents. The agents then update their history and current state, and
make their choice for the following round.
Two main features of this algorithm are the pattern recognition scheme and the
agent’s states. The experiments of Sonsino and Sirota (2003) show that subjects are
able to sustain patterns of Nash equilibria (alternate, not randomly mixed, between
multiple equilibria). Even in 2-by-2 games, the probability of sustaining a pattern of
Nash equilibria for n rounds by random choice decreases exponentially as n increases;
yet subjects are still able to sustain these patterns. People’s ability to sustain these
patterns of equilibria provide evidence that they are in fact recognizing these patterns.
Therefore, pattern recognition is a natural feature when modeling human behavior
in repeated interactions. Our pattern recognition scheme is a modification of the
k-nearest neighbor classification algorithm from machine learning (Dasarathy 1991).
Patterns are recognized by first identifying the current play (the most recent choices
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in the history) and then finding previous plays that are similar to the current play.
The prediction for next round is a weighted average of the outcomes of these similar
plays. In each round, agents make their choice based on their current state, which
are given by two parameters, γ and σ. The γ parameter represents an agent’s current
level of confidence. This is determined by how well that agent predicts what the other
agents will do. The σ parameter represents the agent’s satisfaction of the current play
of the game. If the agent is not satisfied and wants to change what is happening in
the game, then σ is close to 1. If the agent is satisfied with how the game is going
then σ is close to 0. When all agents have high values of γ and low values of σ, then
each agent’s choice has low variance and each agent is satisfied with the predicted
outcome of their choice, so the algorithm has converged.
Another important aspect in the algorithm is that agents are not able to calculate
exact best-responses to their predictions. Instead, agents determine best responses
by randomly sampling from the strategy space, and keeping the strategy that gives
the highest payoff. This is important for two reasons. First, it allows for completely
general payoff functions. Because the explicit best response function isn’t required,
the payoff functions need not be continuous nor differentiable. Also, it allows agents
to have different levels of intelligence by changing the number of samples they take.
For example, a very intelligent agent has a good grasp of the payoff function, and
therefore is able to find the best response. This can be modeled by an agent who
takes a large number of random samples to find the best response. Conversely, a very
unintelligent agent is not able to find the best response. This can be modeled as an
agent that takes a very small number of samples to find the best response.
For a more detailed description of computational testbeds in economics, see Romero
(2008 Working Paper). We have attached the algorithm and a detailed mathematical
description in the Appendix.
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3.3 Prediction
We run simulations using the algorithm on the minimum effort coordination games
and develop testable experimental hypotheses. The benefit of using computational
agents is that simulations are essentially costless, which allows us to run many trials
for each parameter value.
Previous experiments on the minimum effort coordination game have focused on
differences in cost and group size. The experiments have typically compared two
different parameter values: a low and high cost or a small and large group (Goeree
and Holt 2005). Experiments examining a large set of parameters are difficult due to
constraints on the number of subjects in a given subject pool, as well as monetary costs
for running large experiments. Simulations using the algorithm provide a testbed to
simulate these experiments for many different parameter values. Unlike the binary
comparisons, examining a larger set of parameters will give us a better understanding
of the behavior which may have been overlooked in the past.
From the minimum effort coordination game defined in the previous section using
equation 3.1, we run simulations with α = 1, δ = 0, si ∈ [0, 1] for groups of four
agents with 9 different costs, varying from c = 0.1 to c = 0.9. At each parameter
value, we run 300 simulations lasting for 50 rounds.
Convergence Point: We find that higher costs lead to lower convergence points.
Convergence points are the average play over the last 10 periods of the repeated
game. The convergence points of these simulations are displayed in Figure 3.1. This
is consistent with experimental results from minimum effort coordination games as
shown in Goeree and Holt (2005).
Convergence Speed: We then examine the effect of different costs on speed of
convergence.1
Based on the simulations, we find that the number of rounds required to converge
increases with c. A plot of convergence as a function of c is displayed in Figure
3.2 (higher bars mean slower convergence). The intuition for increase in speed of
1We will use convergence in γ as a measure of convergence. See Appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Convergence Points as a Function of Cost



















Figure 3.2: Convergence Speed as a Function of Cost
Higher bars indicate slower convergence
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convergence for higher cost is simple; it is more expensive for agents to search for
different outcomes or experiment with different strategies.
Average Payoff: These convergence results have some interesting effects on the
agent’s payoffs. When agents do not all choose the same effort (i.e., best respond),
the outcome is pareto inefficient. If all agents chose the minimum effort for a given
strategy profile, then everyone’s payoff would be weakly higher, with at least one
receiving a strictly higher payoff. Since it is inefficient when all agents are not choosing
the same effort, slow convergence may lead to lower average payoffs. The average
payoff per agent for different costs is displayed in Figure 3.3. It is difficult to compare
the welfare between two experiments with different costs because they have different
payoff functions. Even though welfare is difficult to compare, the payoff for any given
strategy profile is lower when the cost of effort is higher. Intuition thus suggests
that higher cost of effort should lead to lower average payoffs in the repeated game.
However, we argue that higher cost can actually lead to higher payoffs. The increase in
payoffs due to faster convergence outweighs the decrease in payoffs due to higher cost.
Note that the difference in average payoff shrinks as number of rounds increases in
Figure 3.3. This result is due to the fact that the positive welfare of faster convergence
gets averaged out by the negative welfare of higher cost in effort as the game is played
for more periods.
3.3.1 Hypotheses
We test the following three hypotheses that were generated by the computational
testbed in the experimental laboratory:
Hypothesis 1. Convergence Point: The game will converge to a pareto domi-
nated payoff as the cost of effort increases.
Hypothesis 2. Convergence Speed: The game will converge faster to an equilib-
rium as the cost of effort increases.
Hypothesis 3. Average Payoff: The average payoff does not monotonically de-
crease as the cost of effort increases.
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Figure 3.3: Average Payoffs for Different Costs in Minimum Effort Coordination
Game as a Function of Number of Rounds
3.4 Experimental Design
3.4.1 Overview
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Science Laboratory (CAS-
SEL) located in the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). A total of 60
subjects participated in the experiments. The average performance-based payment
was 20USD. All students were registered as subjects with CASSEL (signed a general
consent form) and the experiment was approved by the local research ethics commit-
tee at both universities. These labs consist of over 30 working computers divided into
a cubicles, which prevents students from viewing another student’s screen.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment software
z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The instructions were available both in print as well as on
screen for the participants, and the experimenter explained the instruction in detail
out-loud. Participants were also given a brief quiz after instruction to insure proper
understanding of the game and the software. A copy of the instruction, as well as the
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payoff tables, are available in the Appendix.
The subjects were randomly assigned to their roles in the experiment. Further-
more, no one participated in more than one experiment. The identity of the partici-
pants as well as their individual decisions were kept as private information. However,
each groups knew their own minimum effort. Experiment used fictitious currency
called francs. The participants were fully aware of the sequence, payoff structure,
and the length of the experiment. All participants filled out a survey immediately
after the experiment.
3.4.2 Details of the Experiment
A total of 20 subjects participated in each session. These 20 subjects were split into
5 groups of 4, and each group used a different cost parameter. The entire session was
divided into 5 blocks, and each block was divided into 15 rounds. After each block,
the subjects were randomly rematched (with replacement) to another group of 4 and
were randomly reassigned another payoff parameter (with replacement). See Figure
3.4 for the time line.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
15 Rounds 15 Rounds 15 Rounds 15 Rounds 15 Rounds
Rematch Rematch Rematch Rematch
Figure 3.4: Timeline and Matching Structure for the Experiment
Subjects played a minimum effort coordination game per round. Their task was
to choose an effort level,
si ∈ {1, ..., 7}







− c(si) + 5950
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In each block, there were 5 groups each with a different payoff matrix based on
c ∈ {50, 500, 900, 950, 990}
The subjects were shown the payoff table displayed in Table 3.1, with the calculation
already completed for the subjects. The group size, randomization, and the fact that
everyone in the group were using the same payoff table were common knowledge.
However, the group’s own minimum effort was private information to the group and
was not available to the outside members.
Minimimum effort of all agents
i’s Effort 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 12950− 7c 11950− 7c 10950− 7c 9950− 7c 8950− 7c 7950− 7c 6950− 7c
6 − 11950− 6c 10950− 6c 9950− 6c 8950− 6c 7950− 6c 6950− 6c
5 − − 10950− 5c 9950− 5c 8950− 5c 7950− 5c 6950− 5c
4 − − − 9950− 4c 8950− 4c 7950− 4c 6950− 4c
3 − − − − 8950− 3c 7950− 3c 6950− 3c
2 − − − − − 7950− 2c 6950− 2c
1 − − − − − − 6950− c
Table 3.1: Sample Payoff Table that was used in the Experiment
Calculations were already filled in for the subjects
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3.5 Experimental Results
Figure 3.5 illustrates sample results from one of the block of sessions. Figure 3.5
(a) is an example where there is a high level of coordination (converging to an effort
level of 7) and Figure 3.5 (b) is an example where there is a low level of coordination
(converging to an effort level of 1).


























(a) Coordination to High Effort (b) Coordination to Low Effort
Figure 3.5: Sample Results From One of The Block of Session for Illustration Purpose
The thin lines represent individual choices and the thick line represents the group’s minimum choice
3.5.1 Convergence Points
First, we test the hypothesis that higher costs will lead to lower convergence points
and provide the results in Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Figure 3.6. These results are
taken from the average choice of the last 5 rounds and it supports the hypothesis that
the average choice drops as the cost parameter increases. While the cost parameter
between c ∈ {50, 500} provides a high level of average choice around 4.5 to 5, the
average choice drops significantly lower to 1 to 1.2 for cost parameter between c ∈
{900, 950, 990}. Although we do not get a significant difference between the means
from c = 900 and c = 950, we do obtain significant differences in the right direction
for the rest of the mean comparisons.
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c = 50 c = 500 c = 900 c = 950 c = 990
Choice 4.8485 4.5000 1.2864 1.2606 1.1242
SE 0.0932 0.0975 0.0363 0.0391 0.0244
Table 3.2: Average Choice for Different Cost Parameters
µ50 > µ500 µ500 > µ900 µ900 > µ950 µ950 > µ990
p-value 0.0126 0 0.1677 0.0023
t-value 2.2428 21.2006 −0.9642 2.8422
Table 3.3: Average Choice Comparison
Figure 3.6: Average Convergence Points for Different Cost Parameters
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3.5.2 Convergence Speed
Comparing convergence speed is bit trickier than comparing convergence points. Con-
sider the following example in Figure 3.7. If one were to use a rule that the convergence
occurs when there are no deviations (i.e., everyone is best responding), then there
won’t be any convergence until round 13 in the example. When studying experimental
results with subjects from a laboratory, this may be too conservative of a criterion.
Noisy choice in human behavior is often expected in experiments. Whether these
noises are rational or not is another story. However, there are many different ways
of modeling noisy choices, such as the Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and
Palfrey 1995), the Level-K Model, and the Cognitive Hierarchy Model (Camerer, Ho,
and Chong 2004), among others.













Figure 3.7: A Sample Result From a Block of Session
The thin lines represents individual choices and the tick line represents the group’s minimum choice
Here, we provide two means of measuring convergence. First, we use a more
quantitative measure of convergence called v-bounded condition. Then we introduce a
more qualitative and intuitive measure of convergence called the similarness condition.
Definition: We say that the game has converged to a particular equilibrium at
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round t under v-bounded condition if the variance of number of strategies chosen is
always less than v for every round starting from t. Specifically, vart+m(σ1, ..., σn) ≤
v, ∀m ≥ 0.
For example, if the strategy profile σ consists of [3, 3, 3, 4], this will require that
a variance parameter of v ≥ 0.25 will be needed to consider this strategy profile as
converged under the v-bounded condition. See Table 3.4 for other samples of strategy
profile and its required variance parameter for v-bounded condition.
σ Minimum v
[3, 3, 3, 4] .25
[3, 3, 4, 4] .33
[2, 3, 3, 4] .66
[3, 3, 4, 4] .92
[3, 3, 3, 5] 1
Table 3.4: Samples of Strategy Profile and its Required v Parameter for v-bounded
Condition
Using the v-bounded condition criterion for the notion of convergence, Figure 3.8
illustrates the average rounds it took for the game to converge.2Although convergence
speed seems to be increasing as the cost parameter increases, differences are not
statistically significant. Consider the following example from Figure 3.7 to illustrate
why the v-bounded condition may not be a good criterion: We would require v ≥ 9 in
order to allow this particular example to be considered converged under v-bounded
condition due to a large jump in choice of effort by one of the players in round 12.
This does not take into account that the deviation is by one person for only one
period. However, intuitively, one may think that this game has converged at round
4.
Therefore, we use a more intuitive and qualitative measure of convergence. We
consider the number of different strategies being used from the strategy profile for a
given round. We say the game has converged to a particular equilibrium if a high
2We drop the last round deviation because there may be end game effects.
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Figure 3.8: Number of Rounds Needed for Convergence for v ≤ 0.5
proportion of people use the same strategy. We define this as similarness condition.
The added benefit of the similarness condition is that it does not unreasonably pe-
nalize cases where one person may deviate significantly away from the best response
for just one period. By the same token, it also means that this measure treats the
following two strategy profiles as equally converged: [2, 2, 2, 3] and [1, 1, 1, 7].
Figure 3.9 shows the frequency of different strategies played for various cost of
effort. If the game is indeed converging faster under the similarness condition, we
expect to see a higher frequency of blue and sky-blue, which indicates everyone playing
the same strategy and three people playing the same strategy, respectively. As the cost
of effort increases, we observe an increase in frequency of blue and sky-blue. This
increase in frequency holds true for any given round. Furthermore, the frequency
of blue and sky-blue also increases as the experiment proceeds (number of round
increases). In other words, there are many different strategies being played in the
initial round but subjects learn to best respond.
Using this similarness condition as a convergence criterion, we conclude that the
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game converges faster to a particular equilibrium as the cost of effort increases.
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(a) c = 50 (b) c = 500






















(c) c = 900 (d) c = 950











(e) c = 990
All same effort Two different efforts Three different efforts Four different efforts
Figure 3.9: Frequency of Different Strategies Played for Various Costs
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3.5.3 Average Payoff
Finally, we analyze the behavior of the average payoff as the cost increases. Refer to
Figure 3.10 and Table 3.5 and 3.6 to see the average payoff and their mean comparisons
up to 4 rounds for each of the cost parameters from the experiment. What we observe,
and is statistically significant, is that the average payoff does decrease from µ50 = 9088
at c = 50 to µ950 = 4846 at c = 950. However, as the simulation has predicted, the
average payoff at c = 990 of µ990 = 5136 is significantly higher than the average payoff
at c = 950 of µ950 = 4846 (p < 0.05). Although the average payoff of µ900 = 4968
at c = 900 is higher than the average payoff of µ950 = 4846 at c = 950, they are not
statistically different.
Given that we observe a non-monotonicity in average profit as a function of cost
of effort in the first 4 rounds, we test the significance after the entire block of the
experiment (15 rounds). The result is displayed in Figure 3.11 and Table 3.7 and 3.8.
Again, we observe a similar pattern to the results from the first 4 rounds. The average
payoff of µ990 = 5650 at c = 990 is significantly greater than the average payoff of
µ950 = 5560 at c = 950 (p < 0.1). Furthermore, the average payoff in this setting is
the lowest at c = 950, which is also lower than the average payoff of µ900 = 5652 at
c = 900 (p < 0.1).
Another topic worth mentioning is that the difference between the average payoff
when c = 990 and c = 950 diminishes as more rounds are played. This confirms
the prediction made by the simulation in Figure 3.3. As more rounds are played, the
positive welfare from the lower cost averages out the negative welfare from the wasted
effort. For example, after 4 rounds, the difference in average payoff is µ990 − µ950 =
288.9583. But, after 15 rounds, the difference decreases to µ990 − µ950 = 90.1889.
In other words, the non-monotonicity of average payoff is most salient at the initial
phase of the game.
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Figure 3.10: Average Payoff After 4 Rounds
c = 50 c = 500 c = 900 c = 950 c = 990
µ 9088 6527 4968 4846 5136
SEµ 118.05 103.36 115.42 124.51 106.56
Table 3.5: Average Payoffs for Different Cost Parameters After 4 Rounds
µ50 > µ500 µ500 > µ900 µ900 > µ950 µ950 < µ990
p-value 0 0 0.2366 0.0393
t-value 16.3234 10.05 0.7178 1.7632
Table 3.6: Average Payoffs Comparison After 4 Rounds
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Figure 3.11: Average Payoff After 15 Rounds
c = 50 c = 500 c = 900 c = 950 c = 990
µ 9791 7489 5652 5560 5650
SEµ 76.23 53.75 38.61 43.66 35.02
Table 3.7: Average Payoffs for Different Cost Parameters After 15 Rounds
µ50 > µ500 µ500 > µ900 µ900 > µ950 µ950 < µ990
p-value 0 0 0.0557 0.0536
t-value 24.6797 27.75 1.5928 1.6114
Table 3.8: Average Payoffs Comparison After 15 Rounds
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3.6 Conclusion
We utilize a computational testbed to design a laboratory experiment to better un-
derstand the behavior of the minimum effort coordination game. Using the com-
putational testbed, we are able to make predictions of interesting and un-intuitive
behavioral features of the minimum effort coordination game. First, the game con-
verges to a pareto dominated equilibrium as the cost of effort increases. Second, the
game converges faster to an equilibrium as the cost of effort increases. Lastly, the
average payoff does not monotonically decrease as cost of effort increases. Had we
not used the testbed, the likelihood of running across these behavioral features would
have been low and the cost of running multiple sessions to figure out the parameters
would have been expensive.
Another important contribution from this research is to show that the testbed we
have designed effectively predicts human behaviors in the minimum effort coordina-
tion game.
We focused primarily on the behavior of the minimum effort coordination game
as a function of cost. However, our results also suggest predictions from changing the
number of players in the game. These are testable hypotheses we encourage others to
pursue. Furthermore, we have focused mainly on minimum effort coordination game
but we are hopeful that our computational testbed would generalized to other class
of coordination games such as battle of the sexes.
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3.7 Appendix
The explanation of the algorithm is divided up into four parts: notation, prelimi-
nary initialization, round k action, and preparation for round k + 1. For notational
purposes, the superscript typically denotes the agent and the subscript denotes the
round.
3.7.1 Notation
Each agent has a database of information that is used to help make their choice in each
round. At the start of each round, each agent has two parameters in their database,
the confidence parameter γ and the satisfaction parameter σ. These parameters for
agent i in round k are denoted by γik and σ
i
k. The agents use these parameters to help
make their choice. Agent i’s choice in round k is represented by xk(i). The choice of
all agents in round k is given by xk, which yields payoffs pii (xk) = pi
i
k for agent i.
After the agents make their choices, they update their database of information in
preparation for the next round. Each agent makes a prediction about what the other
agents will play in the following round. Let xˆik(j) be agent i’s prediction for agent j’s
play in round k. The full prediction vector, xˆik, consists of predictions for all of the
other agents.
As the game progresses, each agent creates a quasi-best-response matrix. Agent
i’s quasi-best response matrix at round k is denoted by Qik. This matrix helps the
agent determine what they should choose after they have made their prediction. To
do this, the agent groups similar strategy profiles together in the quasi-best-response
matrix. The agent then determines which play is best against these similar strategy
profiles by randomly sampling responses from the strategy space. In the future, when
a similar strategy profile arises, the agent uses this quasi-best-response matrix to help
remember what they did in the past. From this quasi-best-response matrix, the agent
determines the quasi-best-response for their prediction for round k, which is denoted
by xik
∗
. More details about the quasi-best-response are given below in the description
of the algorithm in the preparation for round k + 1 section.
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Each agent also keeps track of their best and worst outcomes. To do this, each
agent randomly chooses J strategy profiles from the uniform distribution on the joint
strategy space S = [0, 1]N . Next, they calculate the payoffs for each of these profiles,
and save the strategy profiles which yield the highest and lowest payoffs, x¯ik and x
i
k,
respectively. These are referred to as the highest and lowest known choices for agent
i in round k. The payoffs for these strategy profiles, p¯iik and pi
i
k, are referred to as the
highest and lowest known payoffs for agent i at round k.
All of this information is stored in the agent’s database, and is available when
they are making their choice in round k.
3.7.2 Initialization
Many learning algorithms contain multiple initialization periods, where the agents
choose randomly in the strategy space. Since the focus of this paper is not long
run convergence, but rather short run behavior, the initialization period has to be
short. Before the first choice is made, the agents randomly choose J strategy profiles
to determine their initial highest and lowest known payoffs, x¯i0 and x
i
0, respectively.
Each agent then makes the initial predictions about the other agents by randomly
drawing a number from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], that is xi1(j) ∼ U [0, 1].
Finally, each agent starts with the lowest possible confidence level, γi1 = 10. They
also start with the highest satisfaction parameter, σi1 = 1, because they have no
reason to try to change the outcome of the game yet. With these initial parameters,
the algorithm is ready to run.
3.7.3 Round k
Entering round k, agent i has a database of information which is used to make a choice
in round k. The choice in round k is a random number from a beta distribution with
mean µ and variance ν2. The mean of the distribution is a convex combination of the
quasi-best-response, xi
∗
k, and the strategy which yields the highest known payoff for
agent i at round k, x¯ik. The weight on each term is determined by the current level
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of satisfaction. If the agent’s satisfaction level is high ( σik = 1) then they play the
quasi-best-response for their prediction. If the agent is not satisfied ( σik < 1), then
they try to move the outcome towards the point which yields their highest known
payoff. That is,
µ = σki x
i∗
k + (1− σki )x¯ik
The variance of the distribution is inversely proportional to the current level of




As the confidence level of the agent increases, the choice distribution has lower vari-
ance, and therefore the choice is more accurate. When the agent is not confident
about what the other agents will do, then his choice distribution has high variance,
and his choice is not as accurate.
After all agents have made their choices as described above, the payoffs are cal-
culated. The agents then learn the choices of the other agents as well as the payoffs
of all agents. At this point, the agents begin their preparation for round k + 1 by
updating their database of information.
3.7.4 Preparation for Round k + 1
The agents have a variety of tasks to perform in preparation for round k + 1.
Update extremes As the game progresses the agents become more acquainted
with the payoff function. To model this, each round the agents update their highest
and lowest known payoffs by taking J random samples from the joint strategy space.
For each random sample zj, the payoff vector is calculated. If the payoff for agent
i from the sample is higher than the highest known payoff for agent i in round k,
3It is not possible to have a distribution over a closed region, if the variance is high, and the the
mean is sufficiently close to the endpoints. If this is the case, then it is corrected by using a modified
beta distribution with mass point on the endpoint.
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then the agent sets the highest known choice for round k + 1 to x¯ik+1 = zj and the
highest known payoff round k+ 1 to p¯iik+1 = pii (zj). If none of the payoffs from the J
sample points are higher than the highest known payoff for agent i at round k, then
the highest known choice and payoff from round k are carried over to round k + 1,






k. The same update is performed for the lowest known
play and payoff.
Prediction for round k + 1 In order to make a choice in round k + 1 it is useful
for the agents to have some prediction about what their opponents are going to do in
round k+1. The prediction scheme used by the agents is a modification of the nearest
neighbor classification algorithm from machine learning. The goal of the prediction
scheme is to make a prediction for xk+1. Since there are N agents, the agents’ choices
at round k are given by the vector xk ∈ RN . A pattern is vector combining one or
more of these choice vectors. For example, a pattern of length 3 is [ xk xk+1 xk+2 ].
The agents divide the history of choice into the current pattern, previous patterns,
and outcomes. Each previous pattern has a corresponding outcome. The algorithm
makes a prediction for the outcome of the current pattern. The agents determine
which of the previous patterns are closest to the current pattern. Then the agents’
prediction is a weighted sum of the outcomes of the closest patterns. The agents
repeat this process for patterns of different lengths, n. After the agent has done this
for all values of n, he compares them, and determines which pattern length provides
the best prediction.
For example, consider a two-player game with the history of play after eight
rounds,
(0, 0) , (1, 1) , (1, 1) , (0, 0) , (1, 1) , (1, 1) , (0, 0) , (1, 1)
Let’s examine the prediction by agent 1 of what agent 2 will play in the ninth
round. First, agent 1 considers patterns of length 1. The current pattern is the most
recent play, (1, 1). This has been played four previous times in rounds 2, 3, 5, and
6. These are the closest patterns. When these closest patterns have been played in
the past, agent 2 has responded by playing 1, 0, 1, and 0 in the respective following
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rounds. These are the outcomes for the four closest patterns. This is not good,
because agent 2 has played 0 half the time, and 1 half the time, so it is difficult to
predict what agent 2 will play in the next round based on patterns of length 1.
Next, agent 1 looks at patterns of length 2. The current pattern in this case is
the play in the previous 2 rounds, (0, 0) , (1, 1). This pattern has been played twice
before in the past, in rounds 1-2 and 4-5. In response to this pattern, agent 2 has
played 1 in both rounds 3 and 6. After patterns of length 2, agent 2 always chose 1.
Therefore, patterns of length 2 are better for prediction that patterns of length 1.
More formally, at the end of the kth round, each agent considers patterns of
different lengths n. For each length, there are k − n previous patterns of length nN
each. The agent forms the previous patterns matrix X ∈ Rk−n×nN and the output
matrix Y ∈ Rk−n×N ,
X =

x1 · · · xn
x2 · · · xn+1
...
...














Each row of the previous patterns matrix is a single pattern, and these are denoted
by Xm for m = 1, . . . , k − n. The current prediction is the vector c ∈ RnN
c =
[
xk−n+1 · · · xk
]
Next, the agent finds the j rows of X which are closest to the current pattern c
in terms of Euclidean distance. To do this, the agent forms the distance vector by









Let J be the set of indices of the j smallest terms in the distance vector d. That is
dj ≤ dk for j ∈ J and k 6= J . These indices correspond to the j rows of X which are
closest to the current point c.
The agent now determines which pattern length gives the best prediction. As
exhibited in the above example, the agent wants to choose the pattern length with
the most similar outcomes. To determine the optimal pattern length for each n, the
agent takes the outcome of the j closest points, and calculates the average of these




‖Yj − Y¯ ‖
Now, the agent compares the variance for all considered pattern lengths and
chooses the pattern length with the smallest variance. If there is a tie, then the
agent chooses the shorter pattern. Note that average variances are higher in higher
dimensions. This is not corrected for, which gives an additional benefit to the shorter
patterns, because shorter patterns are easier to recognize.
Once the agent has selected which pattern length to use, he forms a weighted
average of the closest outcomes. The closer the pattern is to the current outcome,
the higher the weight is. The patterns are weighted using a logistic function. The







Therefore, if the distance to each of the j closest patterns is 0, then the prediction
is just the average outcome from those j closest patterns. The agent makes their
choice for period k + 1 based on this prediction.
Quasi-Best-Response The quasi-best-response helps the agent determine the
best response for his prediction for round k + 1. To do this the agent updates the
quasi-best-response matrix from the previous period, Qik. Each row of the quasi-best-
response matrix consists of three items: prediction about what the other agents will
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do, what agent i should do given that prediction, and the payoff given that strategy
profile. More formally row m has the terms,









Here, qm−i are the choices of the other agents, and q
m
i is the choice of agent i.
Agent i updates Qik as follows. First, agent i determines if the current prediction is
similar to any of the entries already in the quasi-best-response matrix. To do this,
agent i chooses a set, R, of random strategies. For each row of the quasi-best-response




∣∣pii (r,qm−i)− pii (r, xˆik+1)∣∣
Next, the agents find the minimum payoff distance, pd∗ = min pdm. If the distance
is small, i.e., pd∗ < δ, then the two strategies are similar, and therefore are combined
in the quasi-best-response matrix. If pd∗ > δ, then the two strategies are not similar,
so a new entry is created in the quasi-best-response matrix. Let the threshold δ be a




If pd∗ < δ, then the agent updates the row of the quasi-best-response matrix
corresponding to pd∗, call this row m∗. The agent takes the set of R strategies, and





























If pd∗ > δ, then the agent creates a new row for the quasi-best-response matrix,




for all r ∈ R,
with r∗ being the strategy which yields the maximum payoff. The agent then updates







Update γ The parameter γ measures the current level of confidence of the agent.
When the agent makes accurate predictions, his confidence increases. In preparation
for round k + 1, the agent compares his prediction for round k that was made in
round k− 1, xˆik, with the actual play from round k, xk. Based on this prediction and
outcome, the agent updates his confidence as follows,
γk+1 =
α1
‖xˆik − xk‖+ α2
γk
Therefore, if the Euclidean distance between the prediction and the actual outcome
is less than α1 − α2, then the confidence increases. The maximum possible increase
in confidence is α1/α2.
Update σ The parameter σ represents the agent’s satisfaction at the current state
of the game. If the agent is not satisfied with the current outcome, then he may
try to induce the other agents to play something else in order to change the current
outcome. If the agent’s attempt to move is unsuccessful, then he will stop trying. For
example, suppose two agents are coordinating at one of the equilibria repeatedly in
the battle of the sexes game. Agent 1 is at her optimal equilibrium, and Agent 2 is
at his least favored equilibrium. Agent 2 realizes that he can receive a higher payoff
at the other equilibrium. Therefore he will try to induce agent 1 to start playing the
other equilibrium. However, agent 1 may not change the way she is playing, even
when agent 2 is starts playing something else. If agent 2 has tried for a long time
with no success, he will give up, and start playing the original equilibrium. The entire
process of trying to move and giving up is called a moving session.
Agent i will start with the highest satisfaction possible. The satisfaction will
remain at the highest level until some event causes agent i to start a moving session.
In order for the agent to become dissatisfied, he has to have a good idea of what the
other agents are going to play. Therefore, agent i must have a confidence greater than
γMS in order to start a moving session. Given that agent i has confidence greater
than γMS, he will start a moving session in two situations. If agent i knows that all
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agents receive higher payoffs at his highest known play, then he will try to move there
because everyone will receive a higher payoff. Also if agent i’s highest known payoff
increases agent i’s payoff by a large amount, and decreases the other agents’ payoffs
by only a small amount, then he will try to change the outcome. There are also some
situations in which agent i will not start a moving session, even if his confidence is
greater than γMS. If moving to agent i’s highest known play will increase agent i’s
payoff by a small amount, but will decrease all other agents payoffs by a large amount,
then agent i will not try to change the outcome. Also, if agent i has tried to move
before unsuccessfully, then he will not try to move again until he has found a better
strategy.
Once the moving session has started, agent i will try to induce the other agents
to play his optimal strategy. If the play of the game is moving away from the play at
the start of the moving session, and towards the highest play for agent i, then agent
i will continue the moving session. If the play of the game does not move towards
the highest play for agent i, then that round will be considered a failure. If the total
number of failures become to high, then i will stop the moving session.









j 6=i pij (x¯
i
k)− pij (xk)
Σik will be referred to as the relative gain for agent i in round k. Agent i’s payoff at
the highest known play is always greater than his payoff at the current play, because
the agent takes the current play into account when updating his highest known play.
Therefore, switching from the current play xk to agent i’s highest known play xˆ
i
k
will always increase agent i’s payoff. So the numerator of Σik will always be weakly
positive.
The agent will also keep track of the maximum relative gain for round k, Σ¯ik, and
the minimum relative gain for round k, Σik. At the beginning of the game, agent i will
start with maximum relative gain of Σ¯i0 = 0 and minimum relative gain of Σ
i
0 = −1.
The agent will update these extreme relative gains with the current relative gain
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when the current relative gain is more extreme (higher than maximum or lower than
minimum) and confidence is greater than γMS. The role of the extreme relative gains
is to ensure that the agent does not continuously try to move to a point which the
other agents refuse to move to.
Based on the current relative gain, the extremes relative gains, and the confi-
dence, agent i will determine whether or not to start a moving session. When the
denominator of Σik is positive, and hence Σ
i
k > 0, the other agents will benefit on
average when switching from xk to x¯
i






k > γMS, then the agent
will start a moving session because all agents will have higher payoffs at x¯ik. When
the denominator of Σik is negative, the other agents will get lower payoffs on average
when switching from xk to x¯
i
k. However, if Σ
i
k is very negative, then the average
decrease of the other agents payoff will be small compared to the increase for agent




k > γMS then the agent will also start a moving session. To






and γik > γMS.
In the first round of the moving session, agent i will decrease from the full sat-
isfaction level σ = 1 to the level σ = σ0 < 1. Agent i will also set the number of
failures to 0, f = 0. Agent i should not expect the other agents to respond to this
move until they have seen the play in second round of the moving session and had a
chance to respond to it in the third round of the moving session. So the agent will
remain with satisfaction σ = σ0 in the second round of the moving session, and this
will not count as a failure. Starting in the third round, agent i’s satisfaction and
failures will depend on whether the other agents are responding to agent i’s move. In
particular, if the other agents are responding, and play is moving toward the highest
known payoff, i.e.,
‖xk − xˆik‖ > ‖xk+1 − xˆik+1‖
then the satisfaction will increase, σk+1 = ξ¯σk and the number of failures will stay
constant fk+1 = fk (for some ξ¯ > 1). Alternatively, if the other agents are not
81
responding, so play is not moving toward agent i’s highest known payoff, i.e.,
‖xk − xˆik‖ < ‖xk+1 − xˆik+1‖
then the satisfaction will decrease, σk+1 = ξσk and the number of failures will increase
by one, fk+1 = fk + 1.
When the number of failures reaches the threshold fk = f¯ , then the session ends
because the other agents are not responding to the move. After the session ends, the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)   
   






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ambiguity Aversion in Asset
Market: Experimental Study of
Home Bias
4.1 Introduction
Equity Home Bias is a phenomenon in which investors over-invest in home country
assets compared to what the rational model predicts. Despite the fact that, in the
past 4 years, foreign stocks have been outperforming domestic stocks on average, US
investors still maintain a domestic-asset-heavy portfolio. Home bias is not limited
to US investors but occurs worldwide (Figure 4.1). There has been strong empir-
ical support for the existence of home bias paradox and many scholars have made
various arguments trying to explain this puzzle. The inflation rate, exchange rate,
information asymmetry, and information immobility are some of the popular choices
but none of these have been generally accepted or empirically consistent. However,
these explanations are all within a rational choice framework. Here, we propose a
behavioral framework, ambiguity aversion, to help better understand the cause of
equity market home bias. Simply put, we argue that ambiguity aversion inhibits
people from investing in unfamiliar companies. Unlike previous studies, we use an
experimental design with real world assets and test for ambiguity aversion instead of
using fictitious assets or simply showing home bias without an explanation.
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Equity market home bias1 presents an interesting problem because the investors
are being “irrational” in the sense that they are not investing in a pareto-optimal
manner: there exists another portfolio allocation such that the investor does not
face any higher risk (variance) but receives higher expected return. If people are
indeed being irrational with their portfolio selection, then this presents an arbitrage
opportunity. In addition, the irrational behavior raises the question of why investors
are not allocating risks efficiently. Our paper shows that 1) using real world assets
there is home bias, and 2) the bias is caused by ambiguity aversion by showing that
the investor’s subjective probability over foreign assets is sub-additive.
A common argument against ambiguity aversion is that an investor might want
to invest in familiar companies because he knows how well the company will perform
(i.e., informational advantage). Surely, rational choice theorists cannot use that as
an argument with the Efficient Market Hypothesis looming over it (Fama 1970).
However, as an outsider of the firm, it is highly unlikely that the investor has any
useful knowledge. The term “familiarity” that the investor generally refers to is
related to being able to answer nontechnical questions such as “What does the firm
produce? Where are they located?” However, these things should be irrelevant when
it comes to investing. As with the standard finance approach, what the investor truly
needs to know is the expected cash flow and not what the company produces.2
The insights obtained through the study of home bias also help in explaining other
similar behavioral phenomena. For example, an employee often times invests in the
same company in which he works. However, this is not an optimal way to hedge one’s
risk. When Enron collapsed, the employees who also invested in Enron took a double
loss by failing to insure themselves against risk. In a non-investment environment,
our model can help explain some of the everyday consumer purchasing behavior, such
as buying a toothpaste. Consumers are willing to pay the extra premium in order to
buy toothpaste from a brand which is more familiar. Although our study is focused
on the international asset market, the same phenomenon is applicable across contexts.
1We will drop the term “equity” from here on out.
2In terms of efficient market hypothesis, the prices should have already incorporated relevant
informations.
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Figure 4.1: Portfolio Weights: US, Japanese and UK Investors
French and Poterba (1991)
4.1.1 Literature Review
In addition to French and Poterba (1991), many others have documented empirical
support of home bias. Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2003) show that in 1997
the US stocks composed only 48.3% of the worlds stock portfolio yet US investors
portfolios were composed of only 10.1% foreign stocks. Therefore, when considering
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) with the parameters specified using the
world market, US investors are holding less than 1/5th of the foreign assets required
to achieve the efficient frontier. Even in experimental setting, Kilka and Weber (2002)
have shown the existence of home bias in Germany and United States.
To justify the discrepancy between the empirics and the rational model, a num-
ber of explanations have been suggested. One explanation is that there is capital
immobility due to institutional structure. However, international barriers have been
decreasing for the last 30 years yet there is no significant change in the US investors’
portfolio. Moreover, most of the portfolio diversification can be obtained by trad-
ing in American Depositary Receipts (Errunza, Hogan, and Hung 1999). Also, we
observe that the gross equity flow has increased while the net flow stayed constant
(Bekaert and Harvey 1995). Glassman and Riddick (2001) showed that informational
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asymmetry cannot be a good explanation unless we are assuming that the market
portfolio standard deviation is 2 to 5 times higher than what is empirically shown.
Explanation using exchange rate bias is not plausible with CAPM because one can
hedge the exchange rate risk by shorting risk free assets in foreign countries. Even
without hedging, optimal portfolio shows that investors should diversify even with
exchange rate risk. Another explanation is that the investors are trying to hedge the
risk of inflation rate. However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) suggest that this too
is not a plausible explanation unless one assumes a very high level of risk tolerance.
Lastly, in theory, information asymmetry and immobility can help explain home bias
(Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp In Press) but one needs to assume that there is relevant
information gained by non-professional traders. For more detailed review, see Karolyi
and Stulz (2003) and Lewis (1999).
The study reported here provides a behavioral explanation of the home bias para-
dox. From the behavioral economics point of view, ambiguity aversion is a very good
starting point as an explanation for the home bias paradox. For example, Bossaerts,
Ghirardato, Guanaschelli, and Zame (2005) showed that asset markets do react to
ambiguity aversion with fictitious assets. Our research is an experimental study which
shows a positive relationship between ambiguity aversion and home bias. In particu-
lar, the experiments tested whether investors are more ambiguous when it comes to
foreign stocks and how this relates to the level of home bias. Our experiments are
built on Ellsberg (1961)’s example of showing ambiguity aversion.
4.1.2 Agenda
We begin by introducing the theory behind the mean-variance model and its implica-
tions, followed by various theories of ambiguity aversion, and non-additive subjective
probability model we used for the experimental design. We present experimental re-
sults directly after presenting the design for all six experiments. First two designs
target decision-making over individual companies while the last two designs target
decision-making over indices. We end with a summarizing conclusion.
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4.2 Theory
A short review of ambiguity aversion and the mean-variance model is discussed in the
following two subsections. Readers who are familiar with the topic may go directly to
the experimental design section. However, our experimental design is heavily based on
the non-additive probability discussed in the Theory of Ambiguity Aversion section.
4.2.1 Mean-Variance Model and Empirical Data
We follow the argument made by Lewis (1999). The standard model used in finance
is the mean-variance model. The utility function is called the mean-variance utility
when it increases with respect to mean and decreases with respect to variance. In
particular, it has the following form: U = U(EtWt+1, V ar(Wt+1)) where Wt is the
wealth at time t, V ar(•) is the variance-covariance matrix and Et is the expectations
operator taken at time t. Furthermore, assume that ∂U
∂Wt




αt, βt as the proportion of wealth held in domestic and foreign assets at time t,




t ) as turn on domestic assets
and foreign assets at time t. For example, one may consider the following utility
function with all the desired properties: Wt(1 +Etrt+1)− γV ar(WtEtrt+1) where γ is
the risk aversion parameter. Now, solving for the first order condition of the objective





var(rF − rD) +
σ2D − σ2FD
var(rF − rD) (4.1)
where γ = −2WtU2
U1
is the relative risk aversion.
Consider the result from Equation 4.1. As the level of relative risk aversion in-
creases, foreign investment decreases. However, there is a bound on how little one
should invest in foreign companies. In particular, the bound is
σ2D−σ2FD
var(rF−rD) , which is
empirically greater than zero. Table 4.1 shows how much one should hold in foreign
assets for a given relative risk aversion.
Using the empirical data provided from Table 4.1 and optimal foreign holdings
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Summary Statistics of Returns
US Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK EAFE
Mean 11.14 9.59 11.63 11.32 5.81 14.03 12.62 12.12
SD 15.07 18.66 23.33 20.28 26.18 22.50 23.97 16.85
Correlations
US 1.00 0.70 0.44 0.36 0.22 0.26 0.51 0.48
Canada - 1.00 0.43 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.52 0.49
France - - 1.00 0.60 0.42 0.39 0.54 0.65
Germany - - - 1.00 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.62
Italy - - - - 1.00 0.38 0.35 0.51
Japan - - - - - 1.00 0.36 0.86
UK - - - - - - 1.00 0.71
EAFE - - - - - - - 1.00
Foreign Portfolio Shares in Percent of Wealth
Actual γ = 1 γ = 2 γ = 3 γ = 10 Minimum Variance
β 8.00 75.9 57.7 51.6 43.1 39.5
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of International Equity Market
Data are from Morgan Stanley, from Jan 1970 to Dec 1996
by Equation 4.1, even as relative risk aversion goes to infinity, one should still invest
39.5% of his shares in foreign assets. However, we observe approximately only 8% of
the total investments are directed to foreign assets. Hence, using the mean-variance
model, even with unrealistic amount of risk aversion, the level of home bias cannot
be explained.
4.2.2 Theory of Ambiguity Aversion
Decision theorists have defined and modeled ambiguity in several ways. The most
intuitive way of defining ambiguity is that the individual is uncertain about the distri-
bution of the risk (Knight 1921). More uncertain the individual is about the distribu-
tion implies a higher level of ambiguity. For example, the probability distribution of a
coin toss has very little ambiguity (close to 50/50) but the probability distribution of
the weather in Tajikistan (without looking it up on the internet) is pretty uncertain.
To say that a person is ambiguity averse is to say that a person prefers to bet on an
event where he knows more about the distribution. For example, I would rather bet
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on whether the next coin toss will turn up heads than bet on whether the weather in
Tajikistan today is between 40-50 degrees.
Although seemingly intuitive, formal modeling of ambiguity has taken many dif-
ferent approaches. One model assumes that the utility from ambiguous events are
less than the utility from unambiguous events (Sarin and Winkler 1992, Smith 1969).
Another approach lets the weights of ambiguous probability be different from the
weights on unambiguous probability when calculating the expected utility (Einhorn
and Hogarth 1985, Segal 1987). Epstein (1999) states that there are multiple priors
to the probability distribution. Another popular model often used, similar to the
multiple priors approach, provides a range of probability for an event (i.e., probabil-
ity of X ∈ [0.3, 0.7]) instead of a point mass probability (i.e., probability of X = 0.5)
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). The approach we use is from Schmeidler (1989) which
is derived from Choquet (1953-1954), where we relax the assumption that the proba-
bility must add up to 1. We call this approach the non-additive probability approach.
In non-additive probability approach, we keep the assumption that the probabili-
ties are monotonic (p(E) ≤ p(F ) if E ⊆ F ) but not necessarily additive (p(E ∪ F ) 6=
p(E) + p(F ) − p(E ∩ F )). In this model, we measure the level of ambiguity by the
level of sub-additivity. In other words, while p(A) and p(B) are the likelihood of the
events A and B, 1 − p(A) − p(B) measures the lack of “faith” in those likelihoods.
Therefore, bigger sub-additivity (1− p(A)− p(B)) implies higher levels of ambiguity.
Again, an interested reader may refer to Camerer and Weber (1992) for more
detailed discussion and Epstein (1999) for more rigorous treatment.
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4.3 Materials and Methods
A total of 55 people participated in this experiment; 47 were graduate and under-
graduate students from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and 8 were
not Caltech affiliates. The participants were recruited using the Social Science Exper-
imental Laboratory (SSEL) announcement system and public fliers. All participants
were registered subjects with SSEL (signed a general consent form) and this exper-
iment was approved as an exemption by the local research ethics committee. The
experiment was conducted at the SSEL located at Caltech, Pasadena, CA. The lab
consists of 30 working computers divided into a cubical setting. Subjects were phys-
ically prevented from viewing another student’s computer screen. The subjects were
paid a show-up fee of $10 in addition to extra earnings based on their performance
in the experiment.
The experimental designs dealing with individual companies (experiments 1-4)
were programmed using PHP3 and MySQL4 and are divided into four parts plus a
survey section. The experimental designs dealing with indices (experiments 5-6) were
programmed using E-prime5 and are divided into two parts plus a survey section.
Instructions were given prior to each section and were available both in print as well
as on screen. We quizzed the subjects after the instruction to insure they understood






4.4 Control Experiment: Ellsberg Paradox
4.4.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
We used the Ellsberg’s standard two urns and two colored balls experiment as the
control treatment (Ellsberg 1961). An ambiguous urn, urn 1, contains 100 balls with
unknown distribution of red and black. A risky urn, urn 2, contains 100 balls of
which 50 are red and 50 are black. There is risk with urn 2 while uncertainty with
urn 1. This baseline treatment is conducted to obtain an approximation of which
of the investors are ambiguity averse and not ambiguity averse. The experimental
structure below depicts how we go about in eliciting preference for ambiguity.
4.4.2 Experimental Structure
Ellsbergs experiment was administered to the investors in the following manner:
1. Investor is presented with two urns.
(a) Urn 1 contains 100 balls but the number of black or red balls is unknown.
(b) Urn 2 contains 100 balls, of which 50 are black and 50 are red.
2. Setting one: Investor is asked to pick from the following two gambles.
(a) $x dollar if red ball is drawn from urn 1.
(b) $x dollar if red ball is drawn from urn 2.
(c) Indifferent.
3. Setting two: Investor is asked to pick from the following two gambles.
(a) $x dollar if black ball is drawn from urn 1.
(b) $x dollar if black ball is drawn from urn 2.
(c) Indifferent.
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We determined whether the investor is ambiguity averse or not by the choices he
makes in this Ellsberg experiment. In particular, if the investor chooses the gamble
from urn 2 (risky urn) in both settings, then we inferred that the investor was am-
biguity averse. By choosing urn 2 in the first setting, it implies that the expected
utility from gamble two is greater than the expected utility from gamble one. If the
investor chooses urn 2 in the second setting, it implies that the expected utility from
the gamble two is greater than gamble one. The following proposition will show why
this leads to sub-additive probability, and therefore, ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 4.4.1 Under the expected utility maximization framework, choosing the
risky urn in both setting implies sub-additive probability measure.
Proof. Choosing gamble two in the first setting implies that
p(red ball|urn 2)u($x) > p(red ball|urn 1)u($x)
⇐⇒
p(red ball|urn 2) > p(red ball|urn 1) (4.2)
Choosing gamble two in the second setting implies that
p(black ball|urn 2)u($x) > p(black ball|urn 1)u($x)
⇐⇒
p(black ball|urn 2) > p(black ball|urn 1) (4.3)
Since urn 2 has 50 black and 50 red balls, it must be that p(black ball|urn 2) +
p(red ball|urn 2) = 1. From Equation 4.2 and 4.3, this implies that p(black ball|urn 1)+
p(red ball|urn 1) < 1, which leads to a sub-additive probability measure.
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4.4.3 Results
From the Ellsberg’s urn experiment, we found 48.65% of the subjects to be ambiguity
averse. We classified the subject as ambiguity averse if he chose option (b) in both
settings one and two. If the subject chose a mixture of (a), (b) or (c), this classified
him as undetermined, choosing option (a) in both settings classified him as ambiguity
preferred, and choosing option (c) in both settings classified him as ambiguity neutral.
Refer to Table 4.2 to see the complete breakdown. For the rest of the paper, when we
refer to an ambiguity averse subjects, we are referring to the 48.65% of the subjects
who were classified as ambiguity averse. We refer to the complement of the ambiguity
averse population as the non-ambiguity averse subjects.6 One caveat is that, just as
people show different risk preference (although correlated) for different tasks, the






Number of Obs: 37
Table 4.2: Sample Population’s Classification of Ambiguity Preference
6We do not have records of the results on the Ellberg’s urn experiment for subjects from session
1 of the indices experiment due to technical error.
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4.5 Experiment 1: Portfolio Building
Definition 1 A derivative is called a Digital Option if it provides a fixed return
after reaching the strike price on the maturity date.
A digital option is often called an Arrow Security by economists. Consider the
following example of a digital option. A digital call option with strike price k and
payment r is denoted as C(r, k) which pays zero if the stock price s < k and r if
s ≥ k at the maturity date. A digital put option with strike price k and payment r
is denoted as P (r, k) which pays zero if the stock price s > k and r if s ≤ k at the
maturity date.
4.5.1 Setup for Individual Stocks, Experimental Summary,
and Motivation
A motivation for this experiment is to test whether there is home bias in our sample, as
well as how the company choices are correlated with ambiguity aversion. We presented
a collection of 23 domestic and 27 foreign companies to the investor in a random
order. These companies were all from the technology and semiconductor industry to
minimize the industry bias. In addition, these are companies listed as the 50 biggest
companies in the world with respect to their industry by Forbes 2004 magazine.7
Along with a company name the investors were given their company’s ticker symbol,
headquarter location, as well as a brief list of company information which was provided
by finance.google.com. Investors were asked to choose 15 companies to place a digital
put option order and 15 companies in a digital call option order. One option was
given per company chosen by the investor. These digital options had a maturity date
of one week and strike price equal to the stock price at the day of the experiment.
The investors were restricted from using any tools other than the software required
for the experiment. In addition, the investors were not allowed to list a company
for both a put and a call option. The investors were paid based on the performance
7“Biggest company” was measured by a composite of sales, profits, assets, and market value. The
list spans 51 countries and 27 industries.
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of their portfolio after the maturity date of the options which paid $0.50 per option
exercised.
This study answers two major questions. 1. Do investors show signs of home bias?
2. What is the relationship between ambiguity aversion and home bias? We expect
to see the proportion of domestic companies chosen to be greater than 23/50 = 46%.
In addition, we expect to see a positive correlation between the level of home biasness
and ambiguity.
4.5.2 Results
Refer to Figure 4.2 for the average portfolio composition. We tested the hypothesis
of home bias. On average, US companies comprised 52.70% (SE=3.05) of the call
options and 49.21% (SE=2.54) of the put options, which gave a total of 50.95%
(SE=1.30) investment in US companies. The investors were no more likely to choose
call options for US companies nor were they more likely to choose a put option for
US companies. Given that the US companies consisted of only 46% of the possible
companies available to choose, this suggests that there is a home bias level of 4.95%
where the differences are significant at p < 0.01. This is a modest result but this may
be caused by the fact that the experiment limits the industry choice and investors
are required to choose 30 companies.
Despite the fact that half of our subjects were considered to be ambiguity averse
from Ellsberg’s experiment, we do not find a difference between the ambiguity averse
and non-ambugity averse individual when it came to levels of home bias in their
portfolio. In fact, we did not find any correlation between the result from the Ellsberg
treatment and total composition of one’s portfolio.
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Figure 4.2: Share of US Companies in Portfolio
4.6 Experiment 2: Bond or Options?
4.6.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
In this experimental design, the investor was shown one company at a time and was
asked to choose one of the three gambles. Gamble 1 is to receive a bond which pays
$1 one week later, Gamble 2 is to receive a digital call option with exercise value
$1 and Gamble 3 is to receive a digital put option with exercise value $1. These
options are identical to the previous section minus the exercise value. However, the
investor also faced a known risk in a sense that, having chosen gamble 1, he has P
probability of actually receiving the bond. Also, by choosing a gamble 2 or 3, he has
1− P probability of actually receiving the options. In this setting, the probability of
receiving the security of choice becomes an implied cost: lower the probability implies
a higher cost. (Refer to the experimental instructions for a detailed example.)
Each investor gets three domestic companies with P = 33%, three foreign com-
panies with P = 33%, three domestic companies with P = 29% and three foreign
companies with P = 29%. The companies were randomly selected for each investor.
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Investors were paid based on the performance of every trial. After completing the
entire experiment (after part 4), the investors were asked for the level of familiarity
of these 12 companies in the survey section.
Implied assumption is that the subjective probability belief over the stock prices is
independent of the probability of receiving the security (bond and options). With this
assumption, Proposition 2 claims that regardless of the belief over the performance of
the stocks, choosing a bond will imply that the investor is exerting ambiguity aversion
(via sub-additive probability).
Proposition 4.6.1 With any probability p < 33% in the above setting, selecting a
bond will lead to a sub-additive probability measure. In addition, as p decreases, the
level of sub-additivity of the probability measure increases, which implies higher level
of ambiguity aversion.
Proof. Denote x as an event of receiving the bond and y as an event of receiving the
option. Denote v as an event of increase in price and w as an event of decrease in price
of the company’s stock. By assumption, p(y∩v) = p(y)p(v) and p(y∩w) = p(y)p(w).
bond  put ⇐⇒ p(x)u($) > p(y ∩ v)u($)= p(y)p(v)u($) ⇒p(x) > p(y)p(v) hence
p(x)/p(y) > p(v). Similarly, bond  call ⇐⇒ p(x)/p(y) > p(w). We observe that
p(w) + p(v) < 2p(x)/p(y). If p < 33%, then we have p(w) + p(v) <66/67 < 1, hence
sub-additive probability measure. Notice as p decreases, 2p(x)/p(y) also decreases.
Therefore, the level of sub-addivity of the probability measure increases as p decreases.
This section addresses four major questions: 1. Is there a difference in the level
of familiarity between domestic and foreign companies? 2. What is the relationship
between the level of familiarity and individual choices? 3. Are investors more likely
to show higher levels of ambiguity aversion in foreign companies compared to the
domestic companies? And most importantly, 4. Are ambiguity averse investors more
likely to choose bonds than others?
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4.6.2 Results
This section provides the most significant result out of all designs related to individual
companies.
The familiarity of companies were coded using the following method. Investors
were asked during the survey section to state the level of familiarity from “never heard
of it”, “not familiar”, “somewhat familiar”, “familiar”, and “very familiar.” We then
coded the dummy variable using 1 to 5 from “never heard of it” to “very familiar” in
increasing order (µ = 2.18, σ = 1.30).
Table 4.3 presents a simple relationship from the experimental data. In partic-
ular, it addresses whether there is a relationship between familiarity and individual
choices. We see that investors are indeed more familiar with US companies than
foreign companies (ρ = 0.24, p < 0.01). Next, we obtain a significant correlation be-
tween investment decision and ambiguity classification (ρ = −0.16, p < 0.01). This
states that people who were classified as ambiguity averse are more likely to choose
to receive a bond in this experimental treatment. Table 4.3 suggests that the type of
option chosen (call vs put) is not influenced by ambiguity aversion, country origin of
asset, level of ambiguity, or familiarity.
Refer to the graph in Figure 4.3. Here, we present the percentage that an option
was chosen instead of a bond. On average, we find that an option was chosen in 73%
of the trials. We further divide the group to compare the decisions made by ambiguity
averse and non-ambiguity averse individuals, and then further divided the sample by
focusing on domestic and foreign assets. First, we observe that investors classified
as ambiguity averse are more likely to choose an option compared to non-ambiguity
averse investors (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.81 6= 0.67 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.01).
Furthermore, we observe that ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to receive
a bond over option when faced with foreign companies (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.85 6=
0.71 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.1) or US companies (µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.77 6= 0.62 =
µambiguity averse, p < 0.1). Therefore, Figure 4.3 supports our theory and shows that
ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to select a bond, in turn, showing a
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higher rate of sub-additivity in probability.
Next, we divide the sample to see the aggregate rate of option chosen for different
levels of familiarity between ambiguity averse and non-ambiguity averse individuals
in Figure 4.4. While we do not find significant difference between rate of option
chosen between ambiguity averse and non-ambiguity averse investors for high levels
of familiarity (≥ 3), we find significant differences when the familiarity is low. This is
expected since ambiguity aversion is more salient when the asset is not familiar. When
familiarity level is 1, we find that µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.87 6= 0.65 = µambiguity averse,
p < 0.01, which means ambiguity averse investors are more likely to choose a bond
conditioning on familiarity level being 1. When familiarity level is 2, we also find a
statically significant differences: µnon−ambiguity averse = 0.81 6= 0.58 = µambiguity averse,
p < 0.1. Again, these results support our theory: when people are unfamiliar with
an asset, it creates higher rate of ambiguity, in turn, they are more likely to choose a
bond. When people are familiar with an asset, the two class of investors behave in a
similar manner.8
Table 4.4 represents three different random-effects logistical regression models. All
three regressions takes the following functional form in Equation (4.4):
decisionij = α+β1ambiguity aversei+β2us assetj+β3high ambiguity+β4familiarityij
(4.4)
where i is the index for the individuals and j is the index for the companies. For
example, familiarityij means individual i’s familiarity for company j. For the random-
effects model, we panel the data by individual i: therefore, the number of groups equal
the number of subjects and each panel contains all the choices made by that particular
individual. The three different regression models are: All Assets, Familiar Assets, and
Unfamiliar Assets. As the names indicate, we restrict our attention to a subset of
observations for those analyses. Familiar Assets restricts attention to assets with
familiarity levels 3 to 5 while Unfamiliar Assets are restricted to familiarity levels
8Although not statistically significant, what we observe is that with familiar assets, ambiguity
averse individuals are more likely to take the option than the bond compared to non-ambiguity
averse people.
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1 and 2. The decisionij variable took a value of 1 if the investor i chose to receive
an option for company j and 0 if a bond. Ambiguity averse took a value of 1 if the
individual i was classified as ambiguity averse, 0 otherwise. US asset is a dummy
variable representing whether the company j is from US. High ambiguity is also a
dummy variable, taking a value of 1 during P = 29 treatment. Lastly, familiarity
took a value ranging from 1 to 5, least to most familiar.
From All Assets regression, we find that investors are more likely to choose to
receive an option when familiarity is higher (β4 = 0.262, p < 0.1). As expected, famil-
iarity plays a even a stronger and positive role when an asset is familiar (β4 = 1.584,
p < 0.05 under Familiar Assets regression), and it is not significant when it comes
to Unfamiliar Assets regression. In other words, familiarity matters when the in-
vestor is familiar with the asset and the relationship is positive. The high ambiguity
independent variable is positive in all 3 regressions, which means that investors are
more likely to select an option if the required level of sub-additivity increases. Notice
that the US assets independent variable is significant under All Assets and Unfamil-
iar Assets regressions only (p < 0.05). Furthermore, the coefficients are negative:
βallassets2 = −0.765 > βunfamiliarassets2 = −0.848. This suggests that people are more
ambiguity averse when it comes to unfamiliar US assets compared to unfamiliar for-
eign assets. This observation is also supported in Figure 4.3 by showing a higher rate
of selecting the bond option for US compared to foreign assets. The key is that the
β2 is significant for the unfamiliar assets. Lastly, consider the independent variable
titled ambiguity averse. This variable takes 1 if the investor is classified as ambiguity
averse and 0 otherwise. Under the All Assets regression, it has a weakly significantly
and negative coefficient (β1 = −1.015, p < 0.15 two-tailed test), which correctly
suggests that ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to take the bond over the
asset. Furthermore, the ambiguity averse variable is not significant when it comes to
Familiar Assets regression, since people are indeed not ambiguous when it comes to
these assets. Lastly, when considering the Unfamiliar Assets regression, we obtain a
even more negative and statistically significant coefficient, as one would expect if our
theory were to hold true (β1 = −1.275, p < 0.05).
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In summary, our data suggests that: 1. subjects are more familiar with the US
assets, 2. subjects are more likely to choose a bond when they are less familiar with
the company, 3. subjects do not show higher rate of ambiguity aversion to foreign
assets per se; they are ambiguity averse towards less familiar companies which are
more likely to be foreign, 4. in fact, subjects are more likely to dislike unfamiliar
US assets compared to unfamiliar foreign assets and 5. subjects who are classified as
ambiguity averse are more likely to choose a bond.
Ambiguity US High Familiarity Decision Option
Averse Asset Ambiguity Type
Ambiguity Averse 1
US Asset 0 1
High Ambiguity 0 0 1
Familiarity -0.05 0.24*** 0.02 1
Decision -0.16*** -0.10 0.31*** 0.07 1
Option Type 0.11 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 . 1
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Number of Obs: 252. Number of Obs for Optiontype: 185
Table 4.3: Correlation Relationship
Ambiguity Averse: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. US Asset: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. High Ambiguity: 1 if P = 29%, 0 if P = 33%
Familiarity: from 1-5. Decision: 1 if Option, 0 if Bond. Option Type: 1 if Call, 0 if Put
Figure 4.3: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Origin of Assets
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Figure 4.4: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Familiarity
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse. Fi: Familiarity level i
Dependent Variable: Decision = 1 if Option and 0 if Bond
Ind. Variables All Assets Familiar Assets Unfamiliar Assets
Constant 0.899 -4.343** 1.762*
(0.631) (2.201) (0.942)
Ambiguity Averse -1.015# -0.112 -1.275**
(0.679) (0.876) (0.621)
US Asset -0.765** -0.873 -0.848**
(0.358) (0.747) (0.431)
High Ambiguity 1.989*** 1.930** 1.544***
(0.392) (0.761) (0.462)
Familiarity 0.262* 1.584** -0.060
(0.158) (0.683) (0.518)
Log likelihood -116.919 -40.682 -77.758
All Assets: Number of Obs: 252. Number of Groups: 21
Familiar Assets: Number of Obs: 91. Number of Groups: 21
Unfamiliar Assets: Number of Obs: 161. Number of Groups: 21
#p<0.15, *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
Table 4.4: Random-Effects Logit Regression: Decision
Variables are defined in the same manner as Table 4.3
Familiar Assets model restricts attention to assets with familiarity level greater than 2
Unfamiliar Assets model restricts attention to assets with familiarity level less than 3
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4.7 Experiment 3: Company Preference
4.7.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
In this part of the experiment, the investors are shown two companies (A and B)
and asked to choose one of the three gambles: Gamble 1 : A outperforms B, Gamble
2 : B outperforms A and Gamble 3: A equals B. The term outperform means that
the percent change in the company’s stock price is higher than the other companys
percent change one week from the day of the experiment. For the purpose of payment,
we randomly selected one of the trials the investor went through and paid $5 if he
made the correct choice.
The key to this experiment is how the two companies are populated. Recall
that from experiment 1, the investor specified his portfolio. Using this portfolio,
the experiment is programmed to ask for comparison between US companies with
put requests and foreign companies with call requests. In addition, the experiment
also asked for a comparison between US companies with call requests and foreign
companies with put requests. Given that the investor requested a put option for one
company and a call option for another company, he should take the gamble which
states the call company will outperform the put company. If the investor selects the
US company which he requested a put option for over the foreign company which he
requested a call option for, by the proposition below, the investor is showing ambiguity
aversion against the foreign company.
Proposition 4.7.1 After choosing a put option for company A and a call option
for company B, stating that company A will outperform company B leads to a sub-
additivity in probability measure.
Proof. Denote v as an event of increase in price and w as an event of decrease
in price of the company’s stock price. Having chosen a put option for company A
implies that p(w|A) > p(v|A). Having chosen a call option for company B implies
that p(v|B) > p(w|B). Stating that company A will outperform company B implies
that p(v|A) > p(v|B). Since p is a probability measure, highest p(v|A) can be is 1/2.
106
Therefore, 1/2 > p(v|B) > p(w|B) hence p(v|B) + p(w|B) < 1.
This design addresses the following major questions. 1. Do the investors consis-
tently prefer the US companies over the foreign companies? 2. Are the investors who
showed signs of ambiguity aversion during the Ellsberg setting (experiment 1) more
likely to choose US (put) companies over foreign (call) companies?
4.7.2 Results
In short, we do not find any statistically significant results from this experimental
study.
To support that there is sub-additive probability beliefs towards foreign compa-
nies, one would expect to see a higher rate of choosing US put over foreign call gambles
compared to choosing foreign put over US call gambles. In our data, when investors
were making a decision between US put company and foreign call company, investors
preferred the US put over foreign call 22.59% (SE=4.58%) of the time (Figure 4.5).
In other words, the investors exhibited sub-additivity 22.59% of the time. However,
when faced with US call and foreign put, investors preferred the foreign put 25.74%
(SE=3.45%) of the time. The difference is not statistically significant.
As presented below, we further divided the observation by ambiguity category
(Figure 4.5), portfolio composition (Figure 4.6), and conducted various regression
analyses (Table 4.5). However, we did not find any significant result to support our
theory.
The two possible explanation for the results we observed are: 1. familiarity and 2.
risk hedging. The result we observe here may be due to higher familiarity of foreign
companies shown over the US companies. The survey of familiarity of the companies
chosen during the portfolio building section was not taken and cannot be tested.
Another possible explanation which we can infer from the data is that the investors
were hedging their risk. Since the mean share of US companies in the investor’s
portfolio is 51%, we can split the investors into two types: US-heavy investors who
have over 51% of US companies in their portfolio and US-light investors who have
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less than 51%. Then, from Figure 4.6 we observe that among the US-heavy investors,
they are much more likely to prefer foreign put over US call (p < 0.1). However,
this difference disappears when we only consider the US-light investors. Since the
investors over-invested in US assets during the portfolio building section, they may
have decided to under-invest in company comparison section since these are exactly
the same companies they previously invested in. This type of experimental spill-
over is a potential drawback of having the same subject participate in the various
treatments.
Figure 4.5: Company Comparison Choices Made: By Ambiguity
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse
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Figure 4.6: Company Comparison Choices Made: By Portfolio
US-heavy: Portfolio consists of more than 51% US companies. US-light: Portfolio consists of less than 51% US companies
Dependent Variables Independent Variable:
Constant Ambiguity Averse
US-Heavy US Put over Foreign Call 0.143* 0.067
(0.077) (0.109)
Number of Obs: 9. R2: 0.0507
US-Heavy Foreign Put over US Call .379*** -0.153
(0.074) (0.110)
Number of Obs: 9. R2: 0.2157
US-Light US Put over Foreign Call 0.169 0.167
(0.106) (0.138)
Number of Obs: 12. R2: 0.1271
US-Light Foreign Put over US Call 0.116** 0.173**
(0.050) (0.065)
Number of Obs: 12. R2: 0.4125
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 4.5: Regressions: Company Comparison Choices Made
US-heavy: Portfolio consists of more than 51% US companies. US-light: Portfolio consists of less than 51% US companies
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4.8 Experiment 4: Position Holding
Definition 2 A position is a vector θ = (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Rn, where n is the number of
companies available and θi denotes the number of shares of company i.
Definition 3 Holding a short position means that the investor has done the follow-
ing procedure. The investor borrowed the share from another investor and sold it
today at today’s price. Then the investor will buy back the share in the future and
return the borrowed share to the original owner.
One should short a share if he believes that the stock price will drop in the future.
The payoff from short position: pricetoday − pricefuture.
Definition 4 Holding a long position means that the investor has done the following
procedure. The investor borrowed cash to buy the stock today at today’s price. Then
the investor will sell the stock in the future and pay back the borrowed money.
One should long a share if he believes that the stock price will increase in the
future. The payoff long position: pricefuture − pricetoday
Example: θ = (1, 2,−4, 2) with companies Q =(Microsoft, Dell, Shell, IBM).
The holding from this position is θQT which indicates that the investor holds a long
position on 1 share of Microsoft, 2 shares of Dell, shorted 4 shares of Shell and holds
a long position on 2 shares of IBM.
Definition 5 The preference relation  satisfies the sure-thing principle if for
any subset E ⊂ S, (x1, ..., xS), (x′1, ..., x′S), (x1, ..., xS) and (x′1, ..., x′S) are such that
1. For all s /∈ E: xs = x′s and xs = x′s and 2. For all s ∈ E: xs = xs and x′s = x′s
then (x1, ..., xS)  (x′1, ..., x′S) ⇐⇒ (x1, ..., xS)  (x′1, ..., x′S).
4.8.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
This experiment provides a method for testing the behavior of the investor in the
multiple companies setting. This can be seen as investing in funds (such as mutual
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funds). In this experiment, the investor was asked to choose between taking a po-
sition that is shown or taking a bond. We will first discuss the concept behind this
experiment and then discuss the exact implementation in the experimental structure
section. This experiment is structured in the following manner. The investor was
given a list of domestic positions θD 6= (0, ...0) ∈ Rn. We then went through several
iterations and determined the investor’s preference between the position and bond.
Then we asked for the investor’s preference between θ = (θD, θF ) and a bond, where
θF ∈ RM is a position in foreign companies. Again we went through several iterations
in this setting. Lastly, we asked for the investor’s preference between θ∗ = (θD,−θF )
and a bond. For the purpose of payment, an investor was paid from a randomly
selected trial and was paid based on the performance of the choice. If a position was
selected, investor was paid based on the performance of the position. We capped
the earnings at $10 while the minimum was bounded at $0 for the purpose of the
experiment.
The data allows us to test whether the investor’s preferences are consistent. In
other words, if the investor preferred θD over the bond but preferred the bond over
θ = (θD, θF ), then he should prefer θ
∗ = (θD,−θF ) over the bond. Otherwise, he
is violating the sure-thing principle (Savage 1954).9 Same argument applies to the
setting in which the investor prefers bond over θD, θ = (θD, θF ) over the bond and
θ∗ = (θD,−θF ) over the bond.
4.8.2 Experimental Structure
This is divided into two phases. This section is written to provide a detailed expla-
nation of what actually occurred during the experiment and may be skipped. The
overview was explained in the previous section.
Phase 1: Single US and Single Foreign Company
1. Randomly select a US company listed under the call option from experiment 1.
9Note that the violation of the sure-thing principle is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for ambiguity aversion.
111
(a) Ask for preference between the positive position of this company and a
bond.
(b) Repeat this procedure until “position” choice is selected.
2. Randomly select a foreign company.
(a) Ask for preference between a positive position from the US company from
1-b and negative position from the foreign company.
(b) Repeat this procedure until the “bond” choice is selected.
3. Reverse the position for the foreign company from 2-b and ask for preference
between the bond and the position.
Phase 2: Two US and Two Foreign Companies
1. Randomly select 2 US companies (without replacement) and give one a positive
and one a negative position.
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Repeat this 4 times.
2. Randomly select 2 foreign companies (without replacement), give one positive
and one negative position, and pair this with one of the pairs from 1 (without
replacement).
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Do this for all 4 pairs
3. Reverse the foreign company’s position from 2.
(a) Compare the position with a bond.
(b) Do this for all 4 pairs
This section addresses the following two major questions: 1. Do investors violate
the sure-thing principle in the multiple companies setting? 2. If so, who are more
likely to violate the sure-thing principle?
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4.8.3 Results
In this section, each investors provided 5 data points.10 Each data point is a binary
result of whether the investor violated the sure-thing principle. On average, investors
violated the sure-thing principle 0.81 times (SE = 0.164), hence violated the sure
thing principle approximately 1 out of 5 times. These violations of sure-thing principle
supports the argument that investors are ambiguity averse towards foreign assets.
Judging by the regression in Table 4.6, investors are more likely to violate the sure-
thing principle in the position experiment if they are ambiguity averse (β = 4.920,
p < 0.10). This result again supports the theory that ambiguity aversion does play a
role in home bias. However, US-heavy investors are less likely to violate the sure-thing
principle if they are also ambiguity averse (β = −9.367, p < 0.10), which is consistent
with the results from the third experimental design (company comparison).
Dependent Variable: Position
(number of times sure-thing principle was violated)
Ind. Variables Constant Ambiguity US Assets AmbiguityXUS Assets
Averse
-0.404 4.920* 2.109 -9.367*
(1.811) (3.303) (3.430) (6.516)
Number of Obs: 21. R2: 0.1278
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (One-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 4.6: Regression: Violation of Sure-Thing Principle
US Asset: % of US companies in investor’s portfolio
10This is because a series of choices only provides 1 observation.
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4.9 Experiment 5: Portfolio Building with Indices
4.9.1 Setup for Indices
Thus far we have focused on individual companies. We will shift our focus to indices
for the next two experimental designs. Both setup and the experimental designs
for the indices treatment are similar to the setup and the designs for the individual
companies. There are several reasons why we need to consider both indices as well as
individual companies. First, average investors tend to discuss and invest at a company
level for daily trading. However, when the average investors are planning a retirement
plan through financial advisors, they tend to invest in indices that are provided by the
holding company. Secondly, people are more familiar with the companies than indices.
In other words, there is less of a company-level effect or company-level informational
advantage, since indices are composed of hundreds of different companies. Therefore,
showing ambiguity aversion at the indices level may provide a stronger case of home
bias. We are interested to learn whether the ambiguity aversion is concentrated only
at the individual company level or if it is also present at the index level.
For the indices treatment, we have selected 25 domestic and 25 foreign major
indices defined by Bloomberg11 which varied in capitalization size as well as industry
focus. All the investors were initially provided with a web-based prospectus. The
prospectus was created using data provided by Bloomberg which included summa-
rization of the index, value of the index for the past three months and their trading
volume. The sample instructions, screen shots, and the list of indices are provided in
the appendix.
4.9.2 Experimental Summary and Motivation
A motivation for this design is to test whether there is home bias in investment
behavior when dealing with indices. Investors were shown indices one by one and
were asked to build their portfolio. A total of 25 domestic and 25 foreign indices were
11www.bloomberg.com
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shown in a random order. For each of the indices, they were given 3 options: buy
the index, sell the index, or receive a bond instead. The investors were paid based on
the performance of their portfolio 7 days after the experiment was concluded. The
payment structure was:
• If bond: $1.00
• If buy: $1.00 + (20× r)
• If sell: $1.00− (20× r)
where r is the return from the index. Although we did not use the term, they were
actually going long or short on the indices. The returns were multiplied by a factor
of 20 to stimulate long term investment.
This study answers the following major questions: 1. Is there home bias when
investing in indices? 2. Are investors more familiar with US indices? 3. Are people
more likely to buy, sell, or receive a bond with US assets? 4. Do ambiguity averse
investors have different portfolio composition? Overall, what is the relationship be-
tween familiarity, ambiguity aversion, and investment choices?
4.9.3 Results
First, just as with the individual company treatment, investors are indeed more fa-
miliar with the US indices than the foreign indices. When investors were asked to
rate the familiarity of each index from 1-6, 1 being least and 6 being most familiar,
the average familiarity for US indices was 2.057 (SE = 0.032) and for foreign indices
was 1.268 (SE = 0.018), significantly different at p < 0.01. In fact, the correlation of
familiarity is stronger for indices (ρ = 0.364, p < 0.01) than for individual companies
(ρ = 0.24, p < 0.01).
Three random-effects regressions are presented in Table 4.7 for Bond, Sell and
Buy as the functional form in Equation (4.5):
choiceij = α + β1us indexj + β2index familiarityij + β3ambiguity aversej (4.5)
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where i is the index for the individuals and j is the index for the indices. Bond,
Sell and Buy variables take 1 if the investor chose to receive the respective choice, 0
otherwise. US index is a dummy variable taking 1 for an US index. Index familiarity
ranged from 1-6 as stated above. The ambiguity averse variable takes 1 if the investor
was classified as ambiguity averse via Ellsberg’s experiment, 0 otherwise.
The Bond regression’s significant coefficient is only for the index familiarity (β2 =
−0.029, p < 0.1), which states that investors are more likely to take the bond choice
if they are less familiar with the index. This is consistent with findings from the
individual company treatment. The Sell regression and the Buy regressions also have
one variable that is statistically significant and it is for dummy variable US Index:
β1 = −0.193, p < 0.01 for Sell and β1 = 0.185, p < 0.01 for Buy. This suggests that
investors are much more likely to buy a US asset while less likely to sell a US asset.
This is consistent with a home biased investor.
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 presents the composition of investor’s portfolio. Overall,
we find that investors are more likely to buy than to receive a bond or sell (p < 0.01)
although the difference in bond and selling is not significantly different. The biggest
contrast appears when comparing US indices to foreign indices. There is no significant
differences when comparing the ratio of selling and bond for US indices but investors
are much more likely to buy US indices: composed over 50% of the portfolio (p <
0.01). However, the investment ratio is more evenly spread out when it comes to
foreign indices. There is no significant difference when comparing buying and selling
behavior for the US indices. When we divide the observation to high familiarity
(familiarity level > 2) to low familiarity (familiarity level ≤ 2, investors are much
more likely to choose to buy than to sell or receive a bond with in both categories
(p < 0.01). Furthermore, investors have higher ratio of bond when it comes to low
familiarity indices compared to familiar indices (p < 0.01). Lastly, with respect to
ambiguity averse to non-ambiguity averse investors, we find that non-ambigity averse
investors are much less likely to take the bond option (p < 0.1). However, there is
no significant difference in the ratio of buying indices, but ambiguity averse investors
have higher ratio of selling (p < 0.05).
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We conclude that investors are: 1. indeed home biased (more buying and less
selling in US indices), 2. more familiar with US indices, 3. more likely to buy familiar
indices, 4. ambiguity averse individuals are more likely to receive a bond, and 5.
more likely to receive a bond when faced with unfamiliar indices.
Dependent Variable
Ind. Variables Bond Sell Buy
Constant 0.304*** 0.394*** 0.303***
(0.065) (0.042) (0.059)
US Index 0.006 -0.193*** 0.185***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.038)
Index Familiarity -0.029* 0.023 0.007
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Ambiguity Averse 0.062 -0.084 0.022
(0.093) (0.053) (0.081)
Overall R2 0.0095 0.0435 0.0389
Number of Obs: 792. Number of Groups: 16.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (Two-tailed test)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 4.7: Random-Effects Regression: Portfolio Composition with Indices
IV: US: 1 if true, 0 otherwise. Index Familiarity: from 1-6 least to greatest. Ambiguity Averse: 1 if true, 0 otherwise
DV: Bond: chose Bond. Sell: chose Sell. Buy: chose Buy
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Figure 4.7: Composition of Portfolio for Indices
Average SE = 0.0178. Maximum SE = 0.0266
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Figure 4.8: Composition of Portfolio for Indices
Average SE = 0.0178. Maximum SE = 0.0266
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4.10 Experiment 6: Bond or Options with Indices
4.10.1 Experimental Summary and Motivation
The design for this experiment is similar to the Bond or Options experiment under
the individual companies treatment. The investors were shown series of indices one
at a time and were given three possible choices just as in the stock treatment:
• Receive a bond which pays $1.00 with probability P .
• Receive a digital call option with exercise value of $1.00 with probability 1−P .
• Receive a digital put option with exercise value of $1.00 with probability 1−P .
However, there are two differences. First, we used indices instead of companies: 25
domestic and 25 foreign, which were presented in random order. Second, we varied
the value of P , the known risk of receiving the actual derivative. Instead of focusing
only on P = 33% or P = 29% as in the individual companies treatment, we varied the
P ∈ {30, 32, 34, 36} for the indices treatment. Note that we are in a super-additive
subjective probability measure once P ≥ 34%.
This study answers the following major questions. What is the relationship be-
tween familiarity, ambiguity aversion, and investment choice?
4.10.2 Results
Table 4.8 presents several random-effects logistical regression models. We regress sub-
additive cases, super-additive cases, and all cases with the following two functional
forms:
decisionij = α + β1us indexj + β2familiarityij + β3P-level (4.6)
and
decisionij = α + β2familiarityij (4.7)
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Table 4.8 details the dependent variables. Consistent with our findings thus far, we
find that people are more likely to take the option with more familiar indices (see
model (1), (2), (4), and (5)). The significance disappears once we focus only on
the super-additive cases and this is expected (see model (3) and (6) in Table 4.8).
Furthermore, model (1) shows that people are also more likely to take the option with
a US index compared to foreign index.
Unlike the case with the individual companies, we do not get a strong result
when analyzing the data by ambiguity and origin of indices (see Figure 4.9). The
difference in rate of choosing an option is not statistically different when we divide
our observation by US indices only and foreign indices only. Furthermore, even in
the aggregate level, the difference is only marginally significant (µnon−ambiguity averse =
0.89 6= 0.84 = µambiguity averse, p < 0.15, two-tailed t-test).
Figure 4.10 compares the decisions divided by ambiguity classification of the in-
vestors and their familiarity level for the indices. Consistent with the results from
the individual companies, we do find that investors are more likely to take the bond
(in turn, showing sub-addivity in subjective probability), when it comes to unfamiliar
assets compared to non-ambiguity averse investors. This difference, again disappears
appropriately when we focus the observation to familiar indices.
In summary, although not as strong as the individual company treatment, we































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.9: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Origin of Indices
Sub-addivity cases only: P ∈ {30, 32}
Figure 4.10: Decision Comparison: By Ambiguity and Familiarity for Indices
AA: Ambiguity Averse. NA: Not Ambiguity Averse
Familiar if familiarity level > 2. Otherwise, Unfamiliar. Sub-addivity cases only: P ∈ {30, 32}
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4.11 Conclusion
We started out this research to show that ambiguity aversion is a possible candidate
for explaining home bias paradox despite what the rational choice model suggests.
We designed experiments that used real world assets and prices. We then used the
concept of sub-addivity to show whether an investor’s choices expressed ambiguity
aversion. Our experimental data supports the theory that ambiguity aversion partly
explains home bias phenomena.
Overall, experiment 5 (Portfolio Building with Indices) provided the strongest
support for home bias in our lab environment and experiment 2 (Bond or Options
with individual companies) provided the strongest support that ambiguity aversion
helps to explain some part of home bias behavior.
In quick summary, we classified about 50% of the participants as ambiguity averse
by using the Ellsberg’s urn experiment. Portfolio building with individual companies
showed a modest size in home bias. Bond or Options with individual companies
experiment showed that investors do show higher rate of ambiguity aversion (sub-
additivity in probability) when it comes to unfamiliar assets, and the investors are
more familiar with US assets. The company preference experiment failed to show
significant results which we contribute to spill-over effect from the portfolio building
experiment. The position holding experiment demonstrated that investors do vio-
late the sure-thing principle approximately 20% of the time, and ambiguity averse
investors are even more likely to violate the principle. Portfolio building with indices
provided evidence that there is home bias in our laboratory setting; investors prefer to
buy familiar indices and are more familiar with US indices. Lastly, Bond or Options
with Indices experiment also showed that, even with indices, investors exhibit higher
rate of ambiguity aversion when investing with unfamiliar indices.
Overall, the results provided here show positive support that ambiguity aversion
as a partial explanation of home bias phenomenon. As Camerer and Karjalainen
(1994) stated, methodologically, “this kind of work is difficult” and that even these
modest size (sub-addivity of less than 5%) in ambiguity aversion “could have impor-
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tant economic consequences” (pp. 348 - 349). Therefore, we are quite content with
our modest result provided through our experiment, and hopeful for future research.
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4.12 Appendix
4.12.1 Instructions for Individual Companies
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4.12.2 Screenshot for Individual Companies

















4.12.3 Instructions for Indices
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